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But the better rule is, that they cannot be sued jointly ; for the
contract of the endorser or guarantor is not the same as the contract
of the maker: Hfumphreys v. Collier, 1 Scam. 47; Brown v.
Knower, Id. 469 ; see Wilson v. Winkle, 2 Gilm. 684. In those
states where suit must first be brought against the maker, a conditional decree cannot be taken against the grantor, and an absolute
one against the maker in the same action : Johnson v. Shepard, 85
Mich. 115 ; see Gordon v. Browne, 3 H. & M. 219.
Amount of BeCover.-Where the money cannot be obtained

from the maker, the consideration which moved from the assignor
for what he receives for the' note, fails, and he is liable to the
assignee for that consideration, with interest, and the costs of suit
against the maker. ",The amount of the note is prima facie evidence that that was the price paid for the assignment ; but this
ought not, we think, to prevent the assignor from showing that the
real value he received was less than the face of the note :" Youse
v. McCreary, 2 Blackf. 243; Smallwood v. Woods, 1 Bibb 542;
Black v. Duncan, 60 Ind. 522; Foust v. Gregg, 68 Id. 390;
Schmied v. Frank, 86 Id. 250 ; Feltonv. Smith, 88 Id. 140. And
if the assignee is not able to recover the full amount paid, with interest and costs from the maker, he may recover the remainder of
the assignor or guarantor: Owings v. Grimes, 5 Litt. 382 ; Scater
v. Wilson, 9 Leigh 478.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.
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Apart from the provisions of treaties on the subject, there exists no well-defined
obligation on one independent nation to deliver to another fugitives from its justice ;
and, though such delivery has often been made, it was upon the principle of comity.
The right to demand it has not been recognised as among the luties of one government to another, which rest upon established principles of international law.
In any question of this kind which can arise between this country and a foreign
nation, the extradition must be negotiated through the federal government, and not
by that of a state, though the demand may be for a crime committed against the law
of that state.
With most of the civilized nations of the world with which we have murh intercourse, this matter is regulated by treaties, and the question we are now to decide
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arises under the treaty of 1842 between Great Britain and the United States, commonly called the " Ashburton Treaty." The defendant in this case, being charged
with murder on board an American vessel on the high seas, fled to England, and
was demanded of the government of that country, and surrendered on this charge.
The Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, in
which he was tried, did not proceed against him for murder, but for a minor offence
not included in the treaty of extradition ; and the judges of that court have certified
to this court for its judgment the question whether this could be done. This court
holds: 1. That a treaty to which the United States is a party is a law of the land,
of which all courts, state and national, are to take judicial notice, and by the provisions of which they are to be governed, so far as they are capable of judicial enforcement. 2. That, on a sound construction of the treaty under which the defendant
was delivered to this country, and under the proceedings by which this was done,
rnd acts of congress on that subject (Rev. Stat. H 5272, 5275), he cannot lawfully
be tried for any other offence than murder. 3. The treaty, the acts of congress, and
the proceedings by which he was extradited, clothe him with the right to exemption
from trial for any other offence, until he has had an opportunity to return to the
country from which le was taken for the purpose alone of trial for the offence
specified in the demand for his surrender. The national honor also requires that
good faith shall be kept with the country which surrendered him. 4. The circumstance that the party was convicted of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on
the same evidence which was produced before the committing magistrate in England,
in the extradition proceedings for murder, does not change the principle.

ON a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York.
Sol.-Gen. Goode, for the United States.
A. J. Wittenhefer, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-This case comes before us on a certificate of division of opinion between the judges holding the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Southern District of New York, arising
after verdict of guilty, and before judgment, on a motion in arrest
of judgment. The prisoner, William Rauscher, was indicted by a
grand jury for that, on the ninth day of October, 1884, on the high
seas, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state of the United
States, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction thereof,
he, the said William Rauscher, being then and there second mate
of the ship J. F. Chapman,'unlawfully made an assault upon Janssen, one of the crew of the vessel of which he was an officer, and
unlawfully inflicted upon said Jenssen cruel and unusual punishment.
This indictment was found under section 5347 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States.
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The statement of the division of opinion between the judges is
in the following language:
"This cause coming on to be heard at this term, before judgment
upon the verdict, on a motion in arrest of judgment, and also on a
motion for a new trial before the two judges above mentioned, at
such hearing the following questions occurred:
"First. The prisoner having been extradited upon a charge of
murder, on the high seas, of one Janssen, under section 5339, Rev.
Stat. U. S., had the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New
York jurisdiction to put him to trial upon au indictment, under
section 5347, Rev. Stat. U. S., charging him with cruel and unusual
punishment of the same man ; he being one of the crew of an
American vessel of which the defendant was an officer, and such
punishment consisting of the identical acts proved in the extradition proceedings ?
" Second. Did or not the prisoner, under the extradition treaty
with Great Britain, having been surrendered upon a charge of murder, acquire a right to be exempt from prosecution upon the charge
set forth in the indictment, without being first afforded an opportunity to return to Great Britain ?
"Third. Was it error on the part of the trial judge to overrule
a plea to the jurisdiction of the court to try the indictment under
section 5347 of the United States Revised Statutes, charging the
accused with cruel and unusual punishment of one Janssen, one of
the crew of a vessel of which accused was an officer; it having been
established upon said plea that the accused was extradited under
the extradition treaty with Great Britain, upon the charge of murder of the same Janssen, under section 5839 of the United States
Revised Statutes ?
"Fourth. Was it error on the part of the trial judge to refuse
to direct a verdict of acquittal, after it had been proven that the
accused was extradited under the extradition treaty with Great
Britain upon the charge of murder; it also appearing that in the
proceedings preliminary to the warrant of extradition the same act
was investigated, and the same witnesses examined, as at the trial ?
"In respect to each of which questions the judges aforesaid were
divided in opinion.
"Wherefore, at the same term, at the request of the United
States attorney, they have caused the points above stated to be cer-
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tified under the seal of this court, together with a copy of the
indictment and an abstract of the record, to the Supreme Court of
the United States for final decision according to law.
"WM. J. WALLACE.
CAS. L. BENEDICT."
The treaty with Great Britain, under which the defendant was
surrendered by that government to ours upon a charge of murder,
is that of August 9th 1842, styled "a treaty to settle and define
the boundaries between the territories of the United States and the
possessions of her Britannic majesty in North America; for the
final suppression of the African slave trade; and for the giving up
of criminals, fugitive from justice, in certain cases." 8 U. S. Stat.
at Large 576.
With the exception of this caption, the tenth article of the treaty
contains all that relates to the subject of extradition of criminals.
That article is here copied, as follows: "It is agreed that the
United States and her Britannic majesty shall, upon mutual requisitions by them, or their ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged
with the crime of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder,
or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged
paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an
asylum or shall be found within the territories of the other: Provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality
as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person
so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime or offence had there been committed;
and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon complaint
made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the
fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such
judges or other magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered; and if, on such
hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient to sustain the charge, it
shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to certify
the same to the proper executive authority, that a warrant may
issue for the surrender of such fugitive."
Not only has the general subject of the extradition of persons
charged with crime in one country, who have fled to and sought
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refuge in another, been matter of much consideration of late years
by the executive departments and statesmen of the governments of
the civilized portion of the world, by various publicists and writers
on international law, and by specialists on that subject, as well as
by the courts and judicial tribunals of different countries, but the
precise questions arising under this treaty, as presented by the certificate of the judges in this case, have recently been very much
discussed in this country and in Great Britain. It is only in modern
times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves
the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the
states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment.
This has been done generally by treaties made by one independent
government with another. Prior to these treaties, and apart from
them, it may be stated, as the general result of the writers upon
international law, that there was no well-defined obligation on one
country to deliver up such fugitives to another; and, though such
delivery was often made, it was upon the principle of comity, and
within the discretion of the government whose action was invoked;
and it ihas never been recognised as among those obligations of one
government towards another which rest upon established principles
of international law.
Whether, in the United States, in the absence of any treaty on
the subject with a foreign nation from whose justice a fugitive may
be found in one of the states, and in the absence of any act of congress upon the subject, a state can, through its own judiciary or
executive, surrender him for trial to such foreign nation, is a question which has been under consideration by the courts of this country
without any very conclusive result.
In the Case of Daniel Washburn, 4 Johns. Oh. 106, who was
arrested on a charge of theft committed in Canada, and .brought
before Chancellor KENT upon a writ of habeas corpus, that distinguished jurist held that, irrespective of all treaties, it was the duty
of a state to surrender fugitive criminals. The doctrine of this
obligation was presented with great ability by that learned jurist;
but, shortly afterwards, Chief Justice TILGHMAN, in the case of
Com. v. Deacon, 10 S. & R. 125, in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, held the contrary opinion,-that the delivery up of a fugitive was an affair of the executive branch of the national government, to which the demand of the foreign power must be addressed;
that judges could not legally deliver up, nor could they command
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the executive to do so ; and that no magistrate in Pennsylvania had
the right 'to cause the person to be arrested in order to afford the
President of the United States an opportunity to deliver him up,
because the President had already declared be would not do so.
In the case of Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, on a writ of
error to the Supreme Court of Vermont, it appears that application
had been made to the President for the extradition of Holmes, a
naturalized citizen of the United States, who was charged with
having committed murder in Lower Canada. There being then no
extradition treaty between the two governments, the President
declined to act through an alleged want of power. Holmes, having
been arrested under authority from Gov. Jennison, of Vermont,
obtained a writ of habeas cor2pus from the Supreme Court of that
state, and the sheriff returned that he was detained under an
order of the governor, which commanded the sheriff to deliver him
up to the authorities of Lower Canada, and the Supreme Court of
the state held the return sufficient. On the writ of error from the
Supreme Court of the United States two questions were presented:
First, whether a writ of error would lie in such case from that court
to the Supreme Court of the state; and, second, whether the judgrent of the latter court was right. The eight judges who heard
the case in this court were equally divided in opinion on the first
of these questions, and therefore no authoritative decision of the
principal question could be made. A very able and learned opinion
in favor of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
United States, and against the right attempted to be exercised by
the governor of Vermont, was delivered by Chief Justice TANEY,
with whom concurred Justices STORY, McLEAN, and WAYNE.
Justices TROMPS0N, BARBOUR, and CATRON delivered separate
opinions, denying the power of the Supreme Court of the United
States to revise the judgment of the Supreme Court of Vermont.
These latter, with whom concurred Justice BALDWIN, did not
express any clear opinion upon the power of the authorities of the
state of Vermont, either executive or judicial, to deliver Holmes to
the government of Canada ; but, upon return of the case to the
Supreme Court of that state, it seems that that court was satisfied,
by the arguments of the chief justice and those who concurred with
him, of the error of its position, and Holmes was discharged. In
the final disposition of the case the court uses the following language: "I am authorized by my brethren," says the chief justice,
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"to say that, on an examination of this case as decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, they think, if the rturn had
been as it now is, a majority of that court would have decided that
Holmes was entitled to his discharge, and that the opinion of a
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States was also
adverse to the exercise of the power in question by any of the separate states of the Union. The judgment of the court therefore is
that Holmes be discharged from his imprisonment." .E parte
Holmes, 12 Vt. 631.
The court of Appeals of New York, in the case of People v.
Curtis, 50 N. Y. 321, also decided that an act of the legislature of
that state, authorizing the rendition to foreign states of fugitives
from justice, was in conflict with the constitution of the United
States. This was in 1872.
The question has not since arisen so as to be decided by this
court, but there can be little doubt of the soundness of the opinion
of Chief Justice TANEY, that the power exercised by the governor
of Vermont is a part of the foreign intercourse of this country,
which has undoubtedly been conferred upon the federal government;
and that it is clearly included in the treaty-making power, and the
corresponding power of appointing and receiving ambassadors and
other public ministers. There is no necessity for the states to
enter upon the relations with foreign nations, which are necessarily
implied in the extradition of fugitives from justice found within the
limits of the state, as there is none why they should in their own
name make demand upon foreign nations for the surrender of such
fugitives.
At this time of day, and after the repeated examinations which
have been made by this court into the powers of the federal government to deal with all such international questions exclusively, it can
hardly be admitted that, even in the absence of treaties or acts of
congress on the subject, the extradition of a fugitive from justice
can become the subject of negotiation between a state of this
Union and a foreign government. Fortunately this question, with
others which might arise in the absence of treaties or acts of congress on the subject, is now of very little importance, since, with
nearly all the nations of the world with whom our relations are such
that fugitives from justice may be found within their dominions or
within ours, we have treaties which govern the rights and cenduct
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of the parties in such cases. These treaties are also supplemented
by acts of congress, and both are in their nature exclusive.
The case we have under consideration arises under one of these
treaties made between the United States and Great Britain, the
country with which, on account of our intimate relations, the cases
requiring extradition are likely to be most numerous. This treaty
of 1842 is supplemented by the acts of congress of August 12th
1848, 9 U. S. Stat. at Large 302, and March 3d 1869, 15 U. S.
Stat. at Large 337, the provisions of which are embodied in sections
5270, 5272 and 5275 of the Revised Statutes, under title 66,
"Extraditions."
The treaty itself, in reference to the very matter suggested in the
questions certified by the judges of the Circuit Court, has been made
the subject of diplomatic negotiation between the executive department of this country and the government of Great Britain in the
cases of Winslow and Lawrence.
Winslow, who was charged with forgery in the United States,
had taken refuge in England, and, on demand being made for his
extradition, the foreign office of that country required a preliminary
pledge from our government that it would not try him for any other
offence than the forgery for which he was demanded. To this Mr.
Fish, the secretary of state, did not accede, and was informed that
the reason of the demand on the part of the British government
was that one Lawrence, not long previously extradited under the
same treaty, had been-prosecuted in the courts of this country for
a different offence from that for which he had been demanded from
Great Britain, and for the trial of which he was delivered up by
that government. Mr. Fish defended the right of the government
or state in which the offence was committed to try a person extradited under this treaty for any other criminal offence, as well as for
the one for which the extradition had been demanded ; while Lord
Derby, at the head of the foreign office in England, construed the
treaty as requiring the government which had demanded the extradition of an offender against its laws for a prescribed offence, mentioned in the treaty and in the demand for his extradition, tb try
him for that offence and for no other. The correspondence is an
able one upon both sides, and presents the question which we are
now required to decide, as to the construction of the treaty, and the
effect of the acts of congress already cited, and of a statute of Great
Britain of 1870 on the same subject. The negotiations between
VOL. XXX)=-29
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the two governments, however, on that subject, were inconclusive in
any other sense than that Winslow was not delivered up, and Lawrence was never actually brought to judgment for any other offence
than that for which his extradition was demanded. The question
was also discussed in the House of Lords, and Lord Derby stated
and defended his views of the construction of the treaty with
marked ability, while he conceded that the act of parliament on that
subject, which declared that the person extradited could be tried for
no other offence than that for which he had been demanded, had no
obligatory force upon the United States as one of the parties to the
treaty. Foreign relations of the United States, 1876-77, pp. 204
-307.
The subject was also very fully discussed by Mr. William Beach
Lawrence, a very learned authority on matters of international law,
living in this country, in several published articles. 14 Alb. Law
J. 85; 15 Id. 224; 16 Id. 361. In these the author, with his
usual ability, maintains the proposition that a person delivered up
under this treaty on a demand charging him with a specific offence
mentioned in it, can only be tried by the country to which he is
delivered for that specific offence, and is entitled, unless found guilty
of that, to be restored in safety to the country of his asylum at the
time of his extradition.
A very able article arising out of the same public discussion
at that time, to wit, 1876, is found in the American Law Review,
said to have been written by Judge LOWELL, of the United States
court at Boston, in which, after an examination of the authorities
upon the general rule, independent of treaties, as found in the continental writers on international law, he says that rule is that the
person whose extradition has been granted cannot be prosecuted and
tried except for the crime for which his extradition has been obtained;
and, entering upon the question of the construction of the treaty
of 1842, he gives to it the same effect in regard to that matter. 10
Amer. Law Rev. 1875-76, p. 617.
Mr. David Dudley Field, in his draft of an outline for an internatiofial code, published about the same time, adopts the same principle. Field, Int. Cod 4, § 237, p. 122. It is understood that the
rule which he lays down represents as well what he understands to
be existing law as also what he supposes it should be.
A very learned and careful work published in this country by
Mr. Spear, in 1884, after considering all the correspondence between
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our government and Great Britain upon the subject, the debate in
the House of Lords, the articles of Mr. Lawrence and Judge LOWELL,
as well as the treatise of Mr. Clarke, an English writer, with a
very exhaustive examination of all the decisions in this country
relating to this matter, arrives at the same conclusion. This exam-.
ination by Mr. Spear is so full and careful that it leaves nothing to
be desired in~the way of presentation of authorities.
The only English work on the subject of extradition we have
been able to find which discusses this subject is a small manual by
Edward Clarke, of Lincoln's Inn, published in 1867. He adopts
the same view of the construction of this treaty, and of the general
principles of international law upon the subject, which we have just
indicated.
Turning to seek in judicial decisions for authority upon the subject, as might be anticipated, we meet with nothing in the English
courts of much value, for the reason that treaties made by the crown
of Great Britain with other nations are not in those courts considered as part of the law of the land, but the rights and the duties
growing out of those treaties are looked upon in that country as
matters confided wholly for their execution and enforcement to the
executive branch of the government. Speaking of the Ashburton
treaty of 1842, which we are now construing, Mr. Clarke says that,
"in England, the common law, being held not to permit the surrender of a criminal, this provision could not come into effect without an act of parliament, but in the United States a treaty is as
binding as an act of congress." Clarke, Ext. 38.
This difference between the judicial powers of the courts of Great
Britain and of this country in regard to treaties is thus alluded to
by Chief Justice MARSHALL in the Supreme Court of the United
States: "1A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations,
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the
object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is infraterritorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of
the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States a
different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty
to be the law of the land. It is consequently to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature whenever
it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision ;
but when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
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addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule
for the court." Foster v. ,Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314.
This whole subject is fully considered in the Head-money Cases,
112 U. S. 580, s. c. 5 Sup. Ot. Rep. 247, in which the effect of
a treaty as a part of the law of the land, as distinguished from its
aspect as a mere contract between independent nations, is expressed
in the following language: "A treaty is primarily a contract
between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its
provisions on the interest and the honor of the government which
are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject
of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured
party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by
actual war. It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts have
nothing to do, and can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or
subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of
the other, which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which
are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts
of the country. An illustration of this character is found in treaties
which regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the
contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or
inheritance when the individuals concerned are aliens. The constitution of the United States places such provisions as these in the
same category as other laws of congress, by its declaration that
'this constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land.' A treaty, then, is a
law of the land, as an act of congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or.subject
may be determined. And, when such rights are of a nature to be
enforced in a court of justice, that court resorts to the treaty for a
rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute." See
also, Chew Heong v. U. S., 112 U. S. 536, 540, 565; s. c. 5 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 255.
The treaty of 1842 being, therefore, the supreme law of the land,
of which the courts are bound to take judicial notice, and to enforce
in any appropriate proceeding the rights of persons growing out of
that treaty, we proceed to inquire, in the first place, so far as pertinent to the questions certified by the circuit judges, into the true
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construction of the treaty. We have already seen that, according
to the doctrine of publicists and writers on international law, the
country receiving the offender against its laws from another country
had no right to proceed against him for any other offence than that
for which he had been delivered up. This is a principle which
commends itself, as an appropriate adjunct, to the discretionary
exercise of the power of rendition, because it can hardly be supposed
that a government which was under no treaty obligation, nor any
absolute obligation of public duty, to seize a person who had found
an asylum within its bosom, and turn him over to another country
for trial, would be willing to do this, unless a case was made of some
specific offence, of a character which justified the government in
depriving the party of his asylum. It is unreasonable that the
country of the asylum should be expected to deliver up such person
to be dealt with by the demanding government without any limitation, implied or otherwise, upon its prosecution of the party. In
exercising its discretion, it might be very willing to deliver up
offenders against such laws as were essential to the protection of
life, liberty and person, while it would not be willing to do this on
account of minor misdemeanors, or of a certain class of political
offences in which it would have no interest or sympathy. Accordingly, it has been the policy of all governments to grant an asylum
to persons who have fled from their homes on account of political
disturbances, and who might be there amenable to laws framed with
regard to such subjects, and to the personal allegiance of the party.
In many of the treaties of extradition between the civilized nations
of the world there is an express exclusion of the right to demand
the extradition of offenders against such laws, and in none of them
is this class of offences mentioned as being the foundation of extradition proceedings. Indeed, the enumeration of offences in most of
these treaties, and especially in the treaty now under consideration,
is so specific, and marked by such a clear line in regard to the magnitude and importance of those offences, that it is impossible to give
any other interpretation to it than that of the exclusion of the right
of extradition for any others.
It is therefore very clear that this treaty did not intend to depart
in this respect from the recognised public law which had prevailed
in the absence of treaties, and that it was not intended that this
treaty should be used for any other purpose than to secure the trial
of the person extradited for one of the offences enumerated in the
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treaty. This is not only apparent from the general principle that
the specific enumeration of certain matters and things implies the
exclusion of all others, but the entire face of the treaty, including
the processes by which it is to be carried into effect, confirms this
view of the subject. It is unreasonable to suppose that any demand
for rendition, framed upon a general representation to the government of the asylum (if we may use such an expression) that the
party for whom the demand was made was guilty of some violation
of the laws of the country which demanded him, without specifying
any particular offence with which he was charged, and even without
specifying an offence mentioned in the treaty, would receive any
serious attention; and yet such is the effect of the construction that
the party is properly liable to trial for any other offence than that
for which he was demanded and which is described in the treaty.
There would, under that view of the subject, seem to be no need of
a description of a specific offence in making the demand. But, so
far from this being admissible, the treaty not only provides that the
party shall be charged with one of the crimes mentioned, to wit,
murder, assault with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery,
forgery or the utterance of forged paper, but that evidence shall be
produced to the judge or magistrate of the country of which such
demand is made of the commission of such an offence, and that this
evidence shall be such as, according to the law of that country,
would justify the apprehension and commitment for trial of the
person so charged. If the proceedings under which the party
is arrested in the country where he is peaceably and quietly
living, and to the protection of whose laws he is entitled, are to
have no influence in limiting the prosecution in the country
where the offence is charged to have been committed, there is
very little use for this particularity in charging a specific offence,
requiring that offence to be one mentioned in the treaty, as well
as sufficient evidence of the party's guilt to put him upon trial
for it. Nor can it be said that, in the exercise of such a delicate
power under a treaty so well guarded in every particular, its provisions are obligatory alone on the state which makes the surrender
of the fugitive, and that that fugitive passes into the -hands of the
country which charges him with the offence, free from all the positive requirements and just implications of the treaty under which
the traisfer of his person takes place. A moment before he is
uinder the protection of a government which has afforded him an
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asylum from which be can only be taken under a very limited form
of procedure, and a moment after he is found in the possession of
another sovereignty by virtue of that proceeding, but divested of
all the rights which he had the moment before, and of all the rights
which the law governing that proceeding was intended to secure.
If, upon the face of this treaty, it could be seen that its sole object
was to secure the transfer of an individual from the jurisdiction of
one sovereignty to that of another, the argument might be sound;
but as this right of transfer, the right to demand it, the obligation
to grant it, the proceedings under which it takes place, all show that
it is for a limited and defined purpose that the transfer is made, it
is impossible to conceive of the exercise of jurisdiction in such a
case for any other purpose than that mentioned in the treaty, and
ascertained by the proceedings under which the party is extradited,
without an implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition. iNo such view of solemn public treaties between the great
nations of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to
give judicial construction to them.
The opposite view has been attempted to be maintained in this
country upon the ground that there is no express limitation in the
treaty of the right of the country in which the offence was committed to try the person for the crime alone for which he was extradited ; and that once being within the jurisdiction of that country,
no matter by what contrivance or fraud, or by what pretence of
establishing a charge provided for by the extradition treaty tie may
have been brought within the jurisdiction, he is, when here, liable
to be tried for any offence against the laws, as though arrested here
originally. This proposition of the absence of express restriction
in the treaty of the right to try him for other offences than that for
which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and object of
the treaty itself. The caption of the treaty, already quoted, declaring that its purpose is to settle the boundary line between the two
governments, to provide for the final suppression of the African
slave trade, adds, "and for the giving up of criminals, fugitive from
justice, in certain cases." The treaty, then, requires, as we have
already said,'that there shall be given up, upon requisitions respectively made by the two governments, all persons charged with any
of the seven crimes enumerated ; and the provisions giving a party
an examination before a proper tribunal, in which, before he shall
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be delivered up on this demand, it must be shown that the offence
for which he is demanded is one of those enumerated, and that the
proof is sufficient to satisfy the court or magistrate before whom
this examination takes place that he is guilty, and such as the law
of the state of the asylum requires to establish such guilt, leave
no reason to doubt that the fair purpose of the treaty is that the
person shall be delivered up to be tried for that offence, and for no
other.
If there should remain any doubt upon this construction of the
treaty itself, the language of two acts of Congress, heretofore cited,
incorporated in the Revised Statutes, must set this question at rest.
It is there declared (Rev. Stat. U. S., § 5272), the two preceding
sections having provided for a demand upon this country, and for
the inquiry into the guilt of the party, that ", it shall be lawful
for the secretary of state, under his hand and seal of office, to order
the person so committed to be delivered to such person or persons
as shall be authorized, in the name and on behalf of such foreign
government, to be tried for the crime of which such person shall be
so accused, and such person shall be delivered up accordingly."
For the protection of persons brought into this country by extradition proceedings from a foreign country, sect. 5275 of the Revised
Statutes provides: " Whenever any person is delivered by-any foreign government to an agent of the United States for the purpose
of being brought within the United States, and tried for any crime
of which he is duly accused, the president shall have power to take
all necessary measures for the transportation and safe-keeping of
such accused person, and for his security against lawless violence,
until the fin,1l'conclusion of his trial for the crimes or offences specified in the warrant of extradition, and until his final discharge
from custody or imprisonment for or on account of such crimes or
offences, and for a reasonable time thereafter, and may employ such
portion of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of the
militia thereof, as may be necessary for the safe-keeping and protection of the accused."
The obvious meaning of these two statutes, which have reference
to all treaties of extradition made by the United States, is that the
party shall not be delivered up by this government to be tried for
any other offence than that charged in the extradition proceedings;
and that, when brought into this country upon similar proceedings,
he shall not be arrested or tried for any other offence than that
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with which he was charged in those proceedings, until he shall have
had a reasonable time to return unmolested to the country from
which he was brought. This is undoubtedly a congressional construction of the purpose and meaning of extradition treaties such
as the one we have under consideration, and, whether it is or not,
it is conclusive upon the judiciary of the right conferred upon
persons brought from a foreign country into this under such proceedings. That right, as we understand it, is that he shall be tried
only for the offence with which he is charged in the extradition
proceedings, and for which he was delivered up; and that if not
tried for that, or after trial and acquittal, he shall have a reasonable
time to leave the country before he is arrested upon the charge of
any other crime committed previous to his extradition.
This precise question has been frequently considered by courts
of the highest respectability in this country. One of the earliest
cases is that of United States v. Caldwell, 8 Blatchf. 131. Caldwell was extradited from Canada, in 1870, under the treaty of 1842
with Great Britain, charged with forgery. He was not tried for
the offence, however, but was tried and convicted for bribing an
officer of the United States-an offence not designated in that
treaty. In the Circuit Court of the United States, held by Judge
BENEDICT, Caldwell called the attention of the court to this fact,
and claimed that, under the treaty, he could not be tried for any
offence, committed prior to his extradition, other than the one
charged in the proceedings. To this plea the government interposed a demurrer, which was sustained, and the prisoner was tried,
convicted and punished for the bribery. Judge BENEDICT said
that, "while abuse of extradition proceedings, and want of good
faith in resorting to them, doubtless constitutes a good cause of
complaint between the two governments, such complaints do not
form a proper subject of investigation in the courts, however much
those tribunals might regret that they should have been permitted
to arise. * * * But, whether extradited in good faith or not, the
the prisoner, in point of fact, is within the jurisdiction of the court,
charged with a crime therein committed; and I am at a loss for even
a plausible reason for holding, upon such a plea as the present, that
the court is without jurisdiction to try him ; * * * and I cannot
say that the fact that the defendant was brought within the juris-'
diction by virtue of a warrant of extradition for the crime of forgery
VOL. XXX.-30
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affords him a legal exemption from prosecution for other crimes by
him commidted."
The next case, tried before the same court, was that of United
States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. 295. Lawrence was extradited
from Ireland, and brought into this country under the treaty of
1842, on a charge of a single and specific forgery. He was indicted and put upon his trial for other forgeries than that specified
in the extradition proceedings. To his trial for any other forgery
than that, he objected by proper pleadings, on the ground that,
under the treaty with Great Britain, he could not be so tried for
other forgeries. Judge BENEDICT held that he could be so tried,
and he was tried, and a verdict of guilty was rendered. It appears,
however, but not very clearly from any report of the case, that,
though tried and convicted, and having pleaded guilty to the other
offences of forgery, he was admitted to bail, and no judgment was
ever pronounced. Judge BENEDICT, adverting to the case of
United States v. Caldwell, and to a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Adriance v. Laagrave, 59 N. Y. 110, proceeded to say: "This ground of defence is therefore dismissed, with
the remark that an offender against the justice of his country can
acquire no rights by defrauding that justice. Between him and
the justice he has offended no rights accrue to the offender by flight.
He remains at all times, and everywhere, liable to be 'called to
answer to the law for his violations thereof, provided he comes
within the reach of its arm."
And in addition to the proposition urged in the Caldwell Case,
that a question of that character arising on the treaty is exclusively
for the consideration of the executive departments of the respective
governments, he proceeds to say: "It is true that it [the act of
Congress] assumes, as well it may, that the offender will be tried
for the offence upon which his surrender is asked, but there are no
words indicating that he is to be protected from trial for all other
offences. The absence of any provision indicating an intention to
protect from prosecution for other offences, in a statute having no
other object than the protection of extradited offenders, is sufficient
to deprive of all force the suggestion that the Act of 1869, as a
legislative act, gives to the treaty of 1842 the construction contended
for by the accused." There are perhaps two or three other cases in
which the circuit or district judges of the United States have followed these decisions rendered by Judge BENEDICT.
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On the other hand, Judge HOFFMAN, of the District Court of
California, in the case of United States v. Watts, 8 Sawy. 370, s. c.
14 Fed. Rep. 130, decided that the defendant, having been surrendered under the extradition treaty of 1842 by Great Britain,
could not be tried for other offences than those enumerated in that
treaty, and supported this view with a very learned and able opinion. Judge DEADY, of the District Court of Oregon, in Ex parte
Hibbs, 26 Fed. Rep. 421, 431 (February 4th 1886), held, in regard
to the treaty of 1842, that, for a government to detain a person
extradited under that treaty for any other charge than the one for
which he had been surrendered, "would be not only an infraction
of the contract between the parties to the treaty, but also a violation
of the supreme law of this land in a matter directly involving his
personal rights. A right of person or property, secured or recognised by treaty, may be set -up as a defence to a prosecution in disregard of either, with the same force and effect as if such right was
secured by an act of Congress."
But perhaps the most important decisions on this question are to
be found in the highest courts of the state.
The case of Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110, has been cited
as supporting the doctrine held by Judge BENEDICT, and undoubtedly the language of the opinion delivered by Chief Justice CHURcH
for the court in that case, adopts the reasoning of Judge BENEDICT'S
opinion. Considering the high character of that court, it may be
proper to make an observation or two on that case. First. It seems
that while Lagrave was held for trial in this country under extradition proceedings, by which he was removed from France under
the treaty of 1843 with that nation, being out on bail, he was arrested under a writ in a civil suit for debt, which issued from one
of the courts of the state of New York. He made application by
a writ of habeas corpus to be released from this arrest, on the
ground that he was protected from it by the terms of the treaty
under which he was surrendered, which, in that respect, are similar
to those of the treaty of 1842 with Great Britain. The difference
between serving process in a civil action brought by a private party,
whether arrest be an incident to that iro.ess or not, and th indictment and prosecution of a person similarly situated for a crime not
mentioned in the treaty of extradition under which the defendant
was by force brought to this country, is too obvious to need comment. And, while it is unnecessary to decide now whether he
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could be so served with process in civil proceedings, it does not
follow that he would be equally liable to arrest, trial, and conviction for a crime, and especially a crime not enumerated in the
extradition treaty, and committed before his removal. Second. The
case of Adriance v. Lagrave was decided in the Supreme Court of
the state by an order discharging Lagrave from arrest under the
writ, and the writ was vacated. This judgment was the unanimous
opinion of the court, in which sat three eminent judges of that
state, to wit, DANIELS, DAVIs and BRADY. In the Court of Appeals this judgment was reversed by a divided court, Judges FOLGER
and GRoV ER dissenting.
While this is believed to be the only decision in the highest
court of a state adopting that view of the law, there are three or
four cases decided by appellate courts of other states holding a
directly opposite doctrine.
The first of these is Com. v. Hawes, 13 Bush 697. Hawes was
demanded from the dominion of Canada, under the treaty of 1842,
on four indictments charging him with as many acts of forgery, and
was delivered up on three of them. He was brought to trial on
two of these indictments in the courts of Kentucky and acquitted,
while the other two were dismissed on motion of the attorney for
the Commonwealth. There were, however, other indictments pending against him, charging him with embezzlement, and on one of
these a motion was made to bring him to trial. Upon this motion
the question was raised whether, under the circumstances in regard
to the extradition, he could be tried for that offence. Judge JAc.soN, before whom the case was pending in the Kenton county
criminal court, decided that he was bound to take judicial notice
of the treaty of 1842 between the United States and Great Britain,
and that the defendant could not be tried for any offence for which
he was not extradited, although he was within the power of the
court, as the treaty was the supreme law of the land. By the terms
of that treaty he held that Hawes could be tried for no other offence,
because that treaty provides only for extradition in certain cases and
under certain circumstances of proof, and that the right of asylum
is to be held sacred as to anything for which the party was not and
could not be extradited. He adds: " I do not mean to say that he
[Hawes] may not hereafterbe tried; but what I mean to say is that,
in the face of the treaty herein referred to, he is not to be tried
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until there is a reasonable time given him to return to the asylum
from which he was taken."
The case was carried to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in
which the whole matter was fully discussed, the opinion of the court
a very able one, being delivered by Chief Justice LINDSAY, in 1878.
The substance of the opinion is thus stated in the syllabus:
"1(1) Extradited criminals cannot be tried for offences not named
in the treaty, or for offences not named in the warrant of extradition. A prisoner extradited from the Dominion of Canada under
article 10 of the treaty of 1842 between the United States and
Great Britain, cannot be proceeded against or tried in this state for
any other offences than those mentioned in the treaty, and for which he
was extradited, without first being afforded an opportunity to return
to Canada; and, after being acquitted on trials for the offences for
which he was extradited, he cannot be lawfully held in custody to
answer a charge for which he could not be put on trial."
"(8) The right of one government to demand and receive from
another the custody of an offender who has sought asylum upon its
soil, depends upon the existence of treaty stipulations between them,
and in all cases is derived from, and is measured and restricted by,
the provisions, express or implied, of the treaty."
In 1881 a case involving the same question came before the
Texas Court of Appeals (Blandford v. State, 10 Tex. App. 627), in
which the same principles were asserted as in that of Hawes. The
case seems to have been very well considered, and the authorities
up to that date were fully examined.
In 1883 the same question came before the Supreme Court of
Ohio, in State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273. Vanderpool and
Jones having been delivered up under the treaty of 1842, by the
Dominion of Canada for offences specified in that treaty, were tried,
convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the crimes for
which they were extradited. They were afterwards indicted for
other offences, to which they pleaded in abatement that, by reason
of the facts already stated, they could not be tried for these latter
offences until a reasonable time had elapsed after the expiration of
their sentefices for the crimes of which they had been convicted.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, to which the case came on appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, sustained this
view, and this was done upon the same general reasoning, already
stated, as to the construction to be placed upon the Ashburton
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treaty, of the obligations of that treaty as a law of the land, and of
the rights conferred upon the party who was arrested and extradited
under its provisions.
Upon a review of these decisions of the federal and state courts,
to which may be added the opinions of the distinguished writers
which we have cited in the earlier part of this opinion, we feel
authorized to state that the weight of authority and of sound principle are in favor of the proposition that a person who has been
brought within the jurisdiction of the court, by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the
offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he
is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable
time and opportunity have been given him, after his release or trial
upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he
had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.
Two other observations remain to be made. One of these is that
the operation of this principle of the recognition of the rights of
prisoners under such circumstances by the courts before whom they
are brought for trial relieves the relations between the executive department of the United States government and the courts of a state
before whom such case may be pending of a tension which has more
than once become very delicate and very troublesome. Of course,
the interference of the executive branch of the federal government,
when it may have been called upon by the nation which has delivered up a person to be tried for an offence against the laws of a
state, with the proceedings of a state court in such case, is likely to
be resented by such court ; and yet, if the only mode of enforcing
the obligations of the treaty is through the action of the respective
national governments, it would seem that the government appealed
to ought to have the right to see that the treaty is faithfully
observed, and the rights of parties under it protected. In Great
Britain the control of such matters would undoubtedly be recognised by any court to be in the crown ; but in this country such a
proposition is, to say the least, not unaccompanied by serious embarrassments. The principle we have here laid down removes this
difficulty; for, under the doctrine that the treaty is the supreme
law of the land, and is to be observed by all the courts, state and
national, " anything in the.laws of the states to the contrary notwithstanding," if the state court should fail to give due effect to the
rights of the party under the treaty, a remedy is found in th judi-
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cial branch of the federal government, which has been fully recognised. This remedy is by a writ of error from the Supreme Court
of the United States to the state court which may have committed
such an error. The case being thus removed into that court, the
just effect and operation of the treaty upon the rights asserted by
the prisoner would be there decided. If the party, however, is
under arrest, and desires a more speedy remedy in order to secure
his release, a writ of habeas corpus from one of the federal judges
or federal courts issued on the ground that he is restrained of his
liberty in violation of the constitution or a law or a treaty of the
United States, will bring him before a federal tribunal, where the
truth of that allegation can be inquired into, and, if well founded,
he will be discharged. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 251 ;
s. a. 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 734. State courts also could issue such a
writ, and thus the judicial remedy is complete when the jurisdiction
of the court is admitted. This is a complete answer to the proposition that the rights of persons extradited under the treaty cannot
be enforced by the judicial branch of the government, and that
they can only appeal to the executive branches of the treaty governments for redress.
The other observation we have to make regards an argument
presented in this particular case, namely, that the prisoner was
convicted on the same testimony which was produced before the
magistrate who ordered his extradition. Although it is thus stated
in the brief, the record affords no sufficient evidence of it. What is
found on that subject in the fourth question certified to this court
is as follows- " Was it error on the part of the trial judge to refuse
to direct a verdict of acquittal, after it had been proven that the
accused was extradited under the extradition treaty with Great Britain, upon the charge of murder, it also appearing that, in the proceedings preliminary t9 the warrant of extradition, the same act was
investigated, and the same witnesses examined, as at the trial ?"
It might be a sufficient answer to this argument to say that this
does not prove that the evidence was the same upon the two trials.
Although the act charged may have been the same, and the witnesses may have been the same, yet the evidence elicited on the last
trial may have been very different from that obtained on the first.
While the identity of facts investigated in the two trials is charged
a little more specifically in the first question, we are of opinion that
no importance should be attached to this matter, even if it were
-
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found that the party was convicted of inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment on the seaman on the same evidence precisely upon
which the committing magistrate in Great Britain delivered him
up under a charge of murder. It may be very true that evidence
which satisfied that officer that the prisoner was guilty of the crime
of murder would also establish that he had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on the person for whose murder he was charged;
but, as the treaty only justified his delivery on the ground that he
was proved to be guilty of murder before the committing magistrate,
it does not follow at all that such magistrate would have delivered
him on a charge, founded upon precisely the same evidence, of
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment; an offence for which the
treaty made no provision, and which was of a very unimportant
character when compared with that of murder. If the party could
be convicted on an indictment for inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment where the grand jury would not have found an indictment for murder, the treaty could always be evaded by making a
demand on account of the higher offence defined in the treaty, and
then only seeking a trial and conviction for the minor offence not
found in the treaty. We do not think the circumstance that the
same evidence might be sufficient to convict for the minor offence,
which was produced before the committing magistrate to support
the graver charge, justifies this departure from the principles of the
treaty.
This fourth question may also properly be treated as immaterial,
for the question is, should the trial judge have directed a verdict
of acquittal ? As all the matters set up by the defendant are in
the nature of pleas in abatement, going rather to the question of
trial on that indictment at that time, and not denying that, at some
future time, when the defendant may have been properly .brought
within the jurisdiction of the court, or rightfully found within such
jurisdiction, he may be then tried, it did not involve an issue on
the question of guilty or not guilty, on which the court, if it proceeded to try that question at all, could direct either an acquittal or
a conviction. Under the views we have taken of the case the jurisdiction of the court to try such an offence, if the party himself was
properly within its jurisdiction, is not denied ; but the facts relied
upon go to show that, while the court did have jurisdiction to find
the indictment, as well as of the questions involved in such inlict-
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ment, it did not have jurisdiction of the person at that time, so as
to subject him to trial. The question, therefore, is immaterial.
The result of these considerations is that the first of the questions certified to us is answered in the negative ; the second and
third are answered in the affirmative ; and it is ordered to be so
certified to the judges of the Circuit Court.
WAITE,

C. J., dissented.

The opinion of the Supreme Court they, on the whole, will be found to conof the United States in the particular firm the conclusion reached in the parcase is one of great interest and impor- ticular case. The cases may be classified
tance. This decision settles a much dis- under several heads.
1. In one class of cases it is held that
puted question, in that it determines that
a person extradited for one offence can- extradition proceedings do not secure to
not lawfully be tried for any other offence the person surrendered for one crime,
until he has had an opportunity to return immunity from prosecution for other
to the country from which he was taken. offences, whether within the treaty or
It seems somewhat remarkable that so not: Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y.
important a principle concerning the 110 (1874) ; United States v. Caldwell,
rights of extradited criminals should not 8 Blatchf. 131 (1871) ; United ,Statesv.
have been established long before this by Lawrence, 13 Id. 295 (1876).
The reason given appears in the statean authoritative decision of the Supreme
ment following, which is taken from the
Court of the United States.
This decision of the Supreme Court opinion in Caldwell's Case, supra: "I
settles this natter in accord with the am of the opinion that the relief could
principle embodied in the English Ex- not be granted, for the reason that the
tradition Act of 1870, providing that "a person of the prisoner is not within the
fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered jurisdiction of the United States by virtue
to a foreign state unless provision is of any warrant issued out of this or any
made by the law of that state, or by court. The prisoner was brought within
arrangement, that the fugitive criminal the jurisdiction of the United States by
shall not, until he has been restored or virtue of a warrant of the executive
had an opportunity of returning to her authority of a foreign government, upon.
majesty's dominions, be detained or the requisition of the executive departtried in that foreign state for any offence ment of the government of the United
committed prior to his surrender, other States ; and while abuse of extradition
than the extradition crime proved by proceedings and a want of good faith in
the facts on which the surrender is resorting to them doubtless constitutes a
good cause of complaint between the two
grounded."
This principle, too, is incorporated in governments, such complaints do not
the proposed new extradition treaty form a proper subject of investigation in
between the United States and Great the courts, however much those tribunals
Britain, recently submitted by the presi- might regret that they should have been
permitted to arise."
dent to the senate for its ratification.
2. In a second class of cases it has
I. An examination of the cases in
which this question has been considered been held that an extradited person canby our courts is not without interest, and not be tried for any offences other than
extradition crimes : Commonwealth v.
while the cases have been in conflict,
VOL. XXXV.-31
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Hawes, 13 Bush (Ky.) 697 ; Blandford
v. State, 10 Texas Ct. of App. 627
(1881).
To try him for an offence not included
in the extradition treaty is to be guilty
of bad faith to the government that consented to his extradition, and is to give
it just grounds for demanding reparation.
It violates the spirit, ifnot the letter of
the extradition treaty. Tile matter is
well put in Commonwealth v. Hawes,
supra, where the Kentucky Court of Appeals say: "It wounld present a remarkable state of the case to have one government saying in substance to another, you
cannot demand the surrender of a person
charged with embezzlement. My judges
or other magistrates have no right or
authority upon such a demand either to
apprehend the person so accused, or to
inquire into the evidences of his criminality; and if they should assume to do
so, and should find the evidence sufficient
to sustain the charge, the proper executive
authority could not lawfully issue the
warrant for his surrender. But yon may
obviate this defect in the treaty by
reciting the demand upon the charge of
forgery, and if you can make out a prina
facie case against the fugitive you may
take him into custody, and then, without
a breach of faith, and witheut violating
either the letter or spirit of our treaty,
compel him to go to trial upon the indictment for the non-extraditable offence
of embezzlement."
3. In a third class of cases it is held
that an extradited person can be tried
only for the particular crime named in
the extradition warrant, until he has
first had an opportunity to return to the
country whence he has been brought.
See State v. Vanderpool; 39 Ohio St. 273
(1883) ; Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627,
642; United States v. W1ratts, 14 Fed.
Rep. 130 (1882) ; Ex parte .Fibbs, 26
Id. 421 (1886).
The decision in-the
case last cited was given by Mr. Justice
DDADY, and contains a review of the
previous cases on the subject, and -he

concludes the whole matter with this
remark: " The weight of this array of
the authorities is in favor of the proposition that an extradited person cannot
lawfully be detained or tried on any
charge other than the one on which he
was surrendered by the extraditing government." And this is the principle
which is now established by the decision
in the particular case, announcing that
the accused "shall be tried only for the
offence with which he is charged in the
extradition proceedings, and for which
he was delivered up, and that if not
tried for that, or after trial and acquittal,
he shall have a reasonable time to leave
"the country before he is arrested upon
the charge of any other crime committed
previous to his extradition."
I. The same question has been raised
in cases of interstate extradition, when
the dispute has been whether a person
extradited from one state to another, for
a certain offence, can be arrested in the
latter state and tried for some different
offence before he is allowed to return to
the state from which he was brought.
Whether a distinction imay properly
be taken on this point between international and interstate extradition, seems
to have been made a question. In Caneno's Case, 47 Mich. 481 (1882), the
Supreme Court of Michigan speaking
through Judge CAMPBELL said, "' We do
not perceive any ground for a distinction." On the other hand, in State v.
Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 (1884), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, speaking
through Judge CAssoD.&Y, says, that the

distinction between international and
interstate extradition is very marked.
That such a distinction exists is emphatically asserted in Haas v. State, 4
Tex. Co. of App. 645 (1878). But
whether or not there is a distinction, the
cases are not at all in harmony as to the
right to try one extradited from a sister
state for an offence other than that for
which he is extradited.
1. Tile following case holds tha: in
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interstate extradition, an extradited person cannot be tried for an offence forwhich
he could not have been extradited, until
opportunity has first been afforded him
to return to the state from which le was
taken: Cannon's Case, 47 Nich. 481
(1882). And see Compton v. Wilder,
40 Ohio St. 130 (1883), which was a
case of arrest in a civil action.
In Cannon's Case, supra, the court
say: "If the requisition had been made
for an expressly fraudulent purpose, and
with no expectation of prosecution for
the crime which was its pretext, we do
not think any department of the government could sanction such a use without
the plainest perversion of justice. No
ingenious reasoning could remove from
such a transaction the disgrace which
no decent commonwealth could afford to
incur. It does not seem to us that it
would be much less fraudulent in law or
wrong in fact, to take advantage of such
an extradition for a similar purpose,
when it is discovered that it never ought
to have been demanded, and was obtained on insufficient grounds."
2. On the other hand the following
cases assert the opposite doctrine: State
v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587 (1884) ; Haas
v. State, 4 Tex. Ct. of Appeals 645
(1878) ; Browning v. Abrams, 51 How.
Pr. 172 (1876) ; Williamsv. Bacon, 10
Wend. 636 (1834).
In the Wisconsin case, great stress is
laid on the fact that the accused might
have been again extradited had he been
allowed to return to the state whence he
was brought, after being tried for the
crime for which he was extradited.
1Tis beiig so, there seems to be no
practical reason for holding that the
relator could not be legally arrested immediately upon his discharge from the
first offence, instead of being allowed to
escape the state and then brought back
on requisition. Such an arrest in such a
case, was certainly not in violation of any
law of the United States. It was not in
conflict with any agreement between the

states. It was no breach of any executive pledge. It was no interruption of
any comitybetween the states. We must
therefore, hold that the arrest was not
illegal by reason of any of the objections
mentioned."
III. It is stated in the particular case,
that there is no well-defined obligation,
in the absence of treaty stipulations,
which requires one country to surrender
to another, for trial and punishment, fugifives from justice, who, having committed
crimes in the latter country, have taken
refuge in the former. While this is undoubtedly so, it is quite worthy of notice
that writers of the highest authority have
held that the rules of international law, in
the absence of any special treaties to that
effect, make it the duty of nations to
surrender to each other criminals who
have escaped from justice. This view
of the matter was taken by Grotius,
Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Chancellor
Kent. But the overwhelming weight
of authority is in favor of the doctrine
that in the absence of treaty stipulations
the duty of extradition is not one of
positive obligation, but simply of comity.
This view of the matter is taken by
Puffendorf, De Vogt, K1iber, Kluit,
Saalfeld, Schmaltz, Mittermaier, De
Cussy, Wheaton, Story, Phillimore, and
Foelix. See Pomeroy's International
Law 236, and Spear on Extradition 3,
(1st ed.). The views of these writers
are sppported by the adjudications of our
courts: The U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sumner
482 ; In the maiter of M11etzger, 5 How.
176; Ig the matter of the British Prisoners, I Woodb. & Minot 66; In the case
of Dos Santos, 2 Brock. (U. S.) 493;
Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush (Ky.)
697; Adriance v. Lagrare, 59 N. Y.
110; Kerr v. People, 1I10ll. 627.
But in the absence of treaty stipulations there have been several notable instances in which fugitives have been surrendered by one nation to another upon
principles of comity. In 1864 Spain
asked the United States to surrender
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Arguelles, a Spanish subject, who was
charged with a violation of the laws of
Spain respecting the slave trade. At
the time there was no treaty between the
two countries providing for the extradition of criminals. The surrender was
made, however, by Secretary Seward,
who acted with Mr. Lincoln's approval. Mr. Spear, in speaking of this
case, in his very excellent book on extradition, says, with nmuch truth, that
the action of the executive in surrendering Arguelles "was an enormous usurpation of power, and, as a precedent, is
one of the very worst in our whole history. It ought to have called forth the
most unqualified censure on the part of
Congress."
The favor thus shown by the United
States to Spain was returned by the surrender in 1876 to this country of the notorious William M. Tweed, who escaped
on December 4th 1875, from the Ludlow
street jail in New York to Spain. Spain
ordered his surrender to the United
States, notwithstanding there was no
treaty between the two countries.
The Supreme Court of the Hawaiian
Islands, in the case of McCarthy (7 Crim.
Law Magazine), May 1886, p. 612,
declares that while it is an unsettled
question how far one sovereign state is
morally obliged to deliver up fugitives
from justice at the demand of another
sovereign with whom there is no extradition treaty, yet such state may make
such a surrender on the requisition of a
friendly government; and that when
there is a treaty, the state of asylum
may, in its discretion, surrender one who
is charged with a crime not mentioned
in the treaty. It is said to be the policy
of the government ofr the Hawaiian
islands to deny the right of asylum to
criminals, and that they will be surrendered without treaty or demand ; that if
the representative of the country whence
the fugitive has fled refuses to accept
such surrender, the fugitive will be expelled from the islands. In that ease

the demand was made by the governor
of California, and the surrender was
made for an offence for which the accused
could not have been extradited under
the extradition treaty made between the
United States and the Hawaiian Islands.
IV. There is another point upon
which we are thankful that the court has
seen fit to intimate its opinion. The
question whether a state has authority to
enact laws for the extradition of fugitive
criminals to foreign countries was not
directly before the court in the particular
case, but we have at least the opinion
of Mr. Justice MILLER, and through

him no doubt the opinion of the court, in
denial of any such right. At this late
day there should be no doubt in any person's mind concerning the exclusive nature of the power of the federal government in matters of international concern.
V. An accused person cannot question
in the courts of his own country the good
faith or regularity of the extradition proceedings.
In Kerv. People, 110 II. 627 (1884),
the facts were as follows : The accused
committed the crime of larceny in Illinois and fled to Peru. While there domiciled, and without any authority or warrant from the authorities or diplomatic
agents of Peru, he was forced on hoard
a vessel and carried to San Eransisco,
and on his arrival there was arrested on
a warrant issued by the governor of
California on a requisition from the
governor of Illinois. He was brought
to Illinois and placed on trial, when he
set up these facts as showing a want of
jurisdiction in the court. The Supreme
Court of the state of Illinois held that it
was no matter if the prisoner had been
illegally arrested in a foreign country
and brought forcibly to Illinois. That
the courts would not inquire into the
regularity of his arrest and surrender, as
the jurisdiction of the court did not at all
depend upon the regularity of those proceedings ; that if the prisoner had been
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illegally and forcibly removed from Peru,
that country al6ne had cause of complaint.
And in the case In re Miller, 23 Fed.
Rep. 32 (1885), the Circuit Court W.
D. Pennsylvania, held that, in the tribunals of his own country, a surrendered
fugitive could not question the good
faith of the extradition proceedings.
In Kelly v. State, 13 Texas Ct. of
App. 158 (1882), the defendant interposed a plea to the jurisdiction of the
court, based on certain irregularities in
the extradition proceedings, he having
been extradited from the republic of
Mexico. He was tried and convicted in
the court below, and on appeal the conviction was sustained. The Court of
Appeals said: "There appear some
irregularities in the proceedings had to
obtain the requisition, but it does not
appear that the extradition was fraudulent or wrongfully obtained, or that it
was in violation of the treaty between
the United States and Mexico."
And so, in State v. Brewster, 7 Vt.
118, 121 (1835), where the court uses
this language: 11It becomes then immaterial, whether the prisoner was brought
out of Canada with the assent of the
authorities of that country or not. If
there were anything improper in the
transaction, it was not that the prisoner
was entitled to protection on his own
account. The illegality, it any, consists
in a violation of the sovereignty of an independent nation. If that nation complain, it is a matter which concerns the
political relations of the two countries,
and in that aspect, is a subject not
within the constitutional powers of this
court. * * * If they waive the invasion
of their sovereignty, it is not for the respondent to object." See, also, People
v. Rowe,4 Parker's Cr. Rep. 253 (1858);
Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 37 (1851)
.n re Miles, 52 Vt. 609 (1880).
A matter of some interest in this same
connection recently came before the governor of New York, and may be here

noticed. One Brown fled from Pennsylvania to Canada to avoid arrest on a
prosecution for perjury. He was induced
to come from Canada into the state of
New York by false and frandulent representations made by certain persons, who
were hired for the purpose by the complainant, they assuming to employ the
prisoner to peddle for them, and then,
upon the pretence that he was going
peddling, persuaded him to cross the
Niagara river with them and come into
New York, at the same time representing to him that the river was the Grand
river, and that by crossing it he would
still be in Canada. He was arrested on
a warrant issued by the governor of New
York, and then made application to the
governor to revoke the warrant on account of the fraud by which he was
induced to cross the Canadian line. This
the governor declined to do, announcing
that the acts done morally deserved
severe reprobation, but that they were
private acts, between individuals, which
could not prevent the state from performing its public duty to another state. The
decision of the governor is given in full
in the Criminal Law Magazine for Sept.
1886, p. 313.
In the treaties recently submitted by
the president to the senate for their approval, it is provided that the provisions
relating to extradition shall not have a
retrospective operation, and that no person shall be extradited for offences already committed who could not be extradited under the existing treaties. These
provisions are important, for, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary in the treaty itself, it hasbeen held
that one may be extradited for an offence
which preceded the treaty.
In Giacomo's Case, 12 Blatch. 391, it
is announced that a treaty providing for
the extradition of offenders whose crime
preceded the treaty, could not be regarded as an ex postfacto law within the
meaning of the constitutional provision
on that subject, as such a treaty imposes
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no punishment, and has nothing to do
with the trial of the offender. In that
case it is said: " The fact of extradition
cannot be properly regarded as punishment, within the sense of that word, as
used when considering the subject of ex
post facto laws. There is no offence
against the United States, and no trial

for any such offence. It is true that
extradition relates only to criminal offences, but it relates only to criminal offences committed abroad; and no treaty
for extradition, nor any statute passed in
relation to extradition, pnrports to punish the fugitive for the offence."
HENRY WADE ROGERS.

Supreme Court of Oregon.
KING v. VOOS ET AL.
Where a wife engages in business, the husband has a right, as against his creditors, to work for her without compensation, and they cannot charge her property
with his debts on the ground that the relation between her and her husband is a
fraud on them.

J. C. Moreland, for appellant, King.
T. N. Strong and -. B. Williams, for respondents, Voos and
others.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LORD, C. J.-This suit is a creditors' bill seeking to subject certain real property described in the complaint, owned by the defendants Fordice Bros., to the payment of certain judgments recovered
against Q. Voos, the husband of Fredericka Voos. The defendant
Fredericka claims that the property referred to was bought with her
own money, earned and accumulated from her restaurant business;
that it was owned, conducted and carried on by her in her own
name and for her own benefit; that she contracted all bills in her
own name, and was individually responsible for all debts ; and that
her husband only assisted her with his services in the management
of the business. The judgments which it is sought to satisfy out
of this property were recovered against the defendant Q. Voos
several years prior to Fredericka's engagement in the restaurant
business. The evidence shows that in the spring of 1875 the defendant Q. Voos went to California, where, shortly after, his wife
joined him, and that from that time until the fall of 1876, when
he returned to Portland, he had engaged in various kinds of business, at different places in that state, all of which proved to be
failures in a business point of view. Returning again to Portland,
although without means, with the assistance of friends, during the
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next three years, he made several other business adventures, all of
which were attended with a like result. At this juncture in their
affairs, when the husband was without money, or credit, or business,
the wife recognised that something must be done, and presently, to
provide a support for their family, which consisted of eight children, besides the defendants. An opportunity offering, in the fall
of 1879, she leased the restaurant and dining rooms of the Occidental Hotel, and began in her own behalf, and on her own individual responsibility, the restaurant business. The arrangement
entered into at that time was regarded as a desirable one, and which
required no particular outlay of money ; and all the facts and circumstances show that this transaction, from its inception, and all
other matters subsequently connected with it, was bona fide; that
she was the party trusted and responsible for all the obligations it
imposed, and all other engagements incidental to the management
and prosecution of the business. Without entering into detai], it
is sufficient to say that during the intervening years, she was the
responsible head of the business, contracting and paying all its
obligations of whatever kind, and managing and directing its affairs
with such prudence, economy and foresight as avoided disaster, and
secured financial success. The profits of the business, when accruing, she prudently husbanded, and, as the result has since proven,
invested them wisely and successfully. The property in question,
which is now sought to be subjected to the payment of the judgments against the husband, was bought by her direction, and for
her, with her money thus acquired, and the deed was executed to
her, and in her name, and is so recorded.
As to these general facts there can be no dispute, although it was
intimated that the arrangement to carry on the business was fictitious, and designed as a cover of fraud. The main contention,
however, arises out of the circumstance that her husband, whose
services were valuable, assisted her in conducting the business without compensation, and that it would be a fraud in law to allow her
to retain the benefit of them, at least in excess of what is required
to support the family. Let it be understood that the evidence satisfies us that the business was her own, and hoxnestly carried on by
her, separately from her husband. In such case, it is clear that the
relation of employee and employer, and principal and agent, may
exist between the husband and wife, without subjecting her interest
in the business, or the acquisitions arising out of it, to the debts
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of the husband. The mere fact that the defendant employs her
husband does not make the business in which she embarks or carries on his business, nor is it perceived why, if she needs an agent
or servant to assist her in the conduct of her business, she may not
employ her husband as well as a stranger. These relations may
exist in the law, and are not inconsistent with good faith and fair
dealing.
But can the husband give his services to the wife, in her separate
business, without committing a fraud upon his creditors, or rendering her interest in the business liable? It is said by Mr. Bump,
that " an arrangement by which the husband acts as his wife's
agent, without any' compensation, or for a compensation that is
insufficient, is, in effect, an attempt to make a voluntary conveyance of the products of his skill and labor in her favor, and is void
as against creditors :" Bump, Fraud. Cony. 270. But this proposition, as thus stated, is thought not to be accurate, nor sustained
by the decisions cited in the note. See opinion of BusKiIK, J., in

Cooper v. Ham, 49 Ind. 393 ; and also Miller v. Peck, 18 W. Va.
81. It is freely admitted, on account of the opportunity that the
marriage relation affords the husband and wife to conduct a scheme
to defraud creditors, that the transaction ought to be vigilantly
scrutinized, particularly when fraud is charged. Any device designed to cover the property or acquisitions of the husband debtor,
or to conduct his business in the name of the wife, or some member
of the family, to defraud creditors, is a sham and a fraud, which,
when discovered, the law will not tolerate, but brand with the mark
of its condemnation. Put the mere fact that the husband gives his
services to the wife in the conduct of her separate business, is not,
of itself, sufficient to vitiate it with fraud, or to make her interest
in the business, or the profits arising out of it, chargeable with his
debts.
In Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 843, it was held that a husband
may work for his wife in the management of her separate business
or property, without any compensation, and that his creditors will
not thereby acquire any rights against the wife or her property.
HUNT, J., said: "In arguing this point, the appellant's counsel
insists that the sery'ices, the time and talents of the husband are
valuable, and he has no more right to give them to his wife, as
against his creditors, than to give to her his property to their prejudice. The one, he says, is as much their property as the other.
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The argument is entirely unsound. The property of a debtor, by
the laws of all commercial countries, belongs to his creditors. He
must be just before he is generous. He must pay before he gives.
Not so with his talents and his industry. Whether he has much or
little, or nothing, his first duty is to support his family. The instinctive impulse of every just man holds this to be the first purpose of his industry. The application of the debtor's property is
rightly directed to the payment of his debts. He cannot transport
it to another country, transfer it to his friend, or conceal it from his
creditor. Any or all these things he may do with his industry.
He is at liberty to transfer his person to a foreign land. He may
bury his talent in the earth, or he may give it to his wife or friend.
No law, ancient or modern, of which I am aware, has ever held to
the contrary. No country, unless both barbarous and heathen, has
ever authorized the sale of the person of the debtor for the satisfaction of his debts." And EARL, J., said : "The creditors of an
insolvent have no claim upon his services. They cannot compel
him to work and earn wages for their benefit, and hence he does
not defraud them, if he chooses to give away his services by working gratuitously for another. The husband may, therefore, in the
management of his wife's separate business or property, work for
her, as any person might, without any compensation, and his creditors would not thereby gain any right against the wife, or her property, and would have no legal right to complain." See, also, 2
Bish. Law Mar. Wom. §§ 450-466.
The law gives the creditor no power over the volition of his
debtor, so that he may direct or control his future labors, or his
contracts relating to the future. Whether the debtor shall exercise
his volition by laboring in his own behalf or for another, is a matter
of his own free choice, which the creditor cannot coerce, control or
prevent. If he choose to work for himself, the acquisitions of his
labors belong to him and the creditor, and the creditor may lay hold
and apply them to the payment of his debt. On the other hand,
if he choose to give his services to his wife in the management of
her separate property or business, the fruit of such labor is not his,
but another's, and, on principle, the creditor cannot seize and appropriate it to the payment of his debt. So that, if a husband
choose to give his wife his services in the conduct of her separate
business, the creditor, having no power over his volition, or to
compel him to work for his benefit, is not defrauded; nor is the fact
VOL. XXXV.-32
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of such service any ground for subjecting her interest in such business, or the profits arising out of it, to the payment of her husband's
debts.
There does not appear by the record to have been any contract
of employment between the husband and wife. He seems to have
rendered his services gratuitously, although they were valuable, and
from the part he took was, as to the other employees, so to speak,
"foreman of the gang." The responsibility of providing for the
family the wife undertook out of her separate business, and if she
derived any assistance from him it arose out of the circumstances
detailed. Under the act of 1880 the wife was released of all "civil
disabilities," not imposed upon the husband, except the right to
vote: Sess. Laws 1880, p. 6; and her property is equally liable for
the expenses of the family; Sess. Laws 1878. Her right to acquire
property, to enjoy the fruits of her labor, or to hold and invest the
profits arising from the successful management of her own trade or
business, can no longer be disputed ; and when, by her industry,
prudence, economy and business foresight, she acquires property in
the management of her separate business, it is her property and not
his, and cannot be liable for his debts.
The case was very thoroughly examined by the learned referee,
and subsequently confirmed, after full argument and thoughtful
consideration, by the court, and the result reached is in accordance
with our views, and the decree must be affirmed.
That a husband may act as the agent
of his wife, for a particular transaction,
or generally for the control of her property, or the investment of her funds,
where his time and skill are not mainly
devoted to such work, without compensation and without thereby rendering her
property liable to his creditors, is a proposition admitting of little or no dispute:
Wells v. &nith, 54 Ga. 262 ; Parkerv.
Bates, 29 Ran. 597 ; Edgerly v. Gregory, 17 Nab. 348; Wo'dworth v. Sweet,

vices to the wife's business without com-

pensation, or other compensation than
his sapport, and not render the products
of that business, under any circumstances, liable for his debts, is a proposition involved in the greatest doubt. It
has been well said in the principal case,
that it is the first duty of the husband to
Accordingly, the
support his family.
weight of authority will be found to support the doctrine that where the husband
devotes his time and skill to the manage51 N. Y. 8 ; National Bank v. Gaylord, ment or service of his wife's business,
66 Ia. 582; Bougard v. (ore, 82 Ill. which is not materially increased thereby, or where his services are not reason19; Wortmaan v. Price, 47 Id. 22;
.Brownell v. Dixon, 37 Id. 197 ; A!dridge ably worth more than the support of
himself and family, neither the capital
v. Muirhead, 101 U. S. 397.
But that a husband, in good faith even, stock nor profits of the business are liamay give his entire time, skill and ser- ble to his creditors : Martinez v. Mard,
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19 Fla. 175 ; Carn v. Royer, 55 Ia.
650 : Suckleford v. Collier, 6 Bush 149;
Bush v. Vought, 55 Penn. St. 437.
In many of the cases usually cited on
this subject, the question of an increase
of the capital stock, or of large profits
due to his services, seems not to have
been raised. In such cases we presume
that no presumption will lie in favor of
such increase, ad no rights of creditors
will attach, generally, to the property
involved : Lewis v. Johns, 24 Cal. 98;
Coon v. .igden, 4 Col. 275 ; Cubberly v.
Scott, 98 Ill.38 ; Bougard v. Core, 82
Id. 19; Olsn v. Kern, 10 Il1. App.
578. Carn v. Royer, 55 Ia. 650 ; Bellows v. Rosental, 31 Ind. 116 : Slack-leford v. Collier, 6 Bush 149; McIntyre
v. Knowlton,. 6 Allen 565 ; Rankin v.
West, 25 Mich. 195 ; Hossfeldt v. Dill,
28 Minn. 469 ; Hamilton v. Booth, 55
Miss. 60 ; Ploss v. Thomas, 6 Mo. App.
157; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343;
Gage v.- Douchy, 34 Id. 293 ; Buckley
v. Wells, 33 Id. 518; Rush v. Vought,
55 Penn. St. 437 ; Voorhies v. Bonesteel, 16 Wall. 16.
1. The courts of some states seem to
have gone further, and declared that
where the husband, without other compensation than the support of himself
and family, has devoted his entire time
and skill to the management of the wife's
business, and thereby greatly increased
it, neither capital stock nor profits are
liable for his debts: Isham v. Schafer,
60 Barb. 317 ; Gage v. Dauchy, 34 N.
Y. 293 ; Kutcher v. Williams, 40 N.
,T. Eq. 436: Hodges v. Cobb, 8 Rich.
(S. C.) 50 ; WTebster v. Hildreth, 33 Vt.
457 ; Stewart, Husb. and Wife, 87.
In Miller v. Peck, 18 W. Va. 75, the
court said: "And if there is not established a want of bona ftides, the business
may be done through the husband, as
her agent, and all accretions, accumulations or appreciation in the value of such
property resulting from handling or exchanging the same, enures to the benefit of the wife, without regard to the

question of coverture. He was her agent,
and ' qui facit per alium, facit per se.'
The law of agency is not changed by
reason of the marital relation, and it
follows that the agent cannot, in the excution of his duties as such, obtain any
tangible interest in the property in his
charge."
Following this principle, it has been
held, that he may devote his time and
services to her business, pa.ying off liens
against her property from the profits of
the business: Cooper v. Ham, 49 Ind.
393. And that a wife may purchase a
farm purely on credit, paying interest
and part of the principal of purchasemoney from the profits of the husband's
cultivation of the farm, without making
it or its products liable to his creditors :
Dayton v. Walsh, 47 Wis. 113 ; Knapp
v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277.
But of an illustration of this bad principle, similar to the last, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania said : "An arrangement to buy property on her credit
and have it managed and paid for by
him, as her agent, is too unsubstantial
and too easily shammed to be at all satisfactory. All these things can be done by
mere words, and words are but breath :"
Keeney v. Good, 21 Penn. St. 349
Commouwealth v. Fletcher, 6 Bush 171.
2. In Illinois, it has been held that
where the husband has the control of the
wife's business, devoting to it his entire
time, both principal and profits are liable for his debts. In Wilson v. Loomis,
55 Ill. 352, the court said : "If it be
conceded that the money that constituted
the capital at the beginning of the trade
was the separate estate of Mrs. Roe,
would that fact entitleher to appropriate
to herself as separate estate the fruits of
her husband's labors through a series of
years, in a trade which, by his skill and
industry, he had rendered most profitable,
to the exclusion of his creditors ? If she
could thus appropriate the results of her
husband's labor, industry and skill, to
herself, as separate estate for a number
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of years, no reason is perceived why she
could not do it for an entire lifetime.
In the event that the wiit had sufficient
separate estate with which to engage in
the business of a general trade, she might
be able to conduct it from year to year,
until by the labor and skill of the husband, they would amass a fortune, and
of the proceeds of that trade belonging
exclusively to the wife as her separate
estate, the creditors of the husband would
be without remedy. It was certainly
never contemplated by the legislature
that any such results would follow from
the act of 1861.
A man's labor and
skill in any trade or branch of business,
is most valuable capital, and it is as unlawful for him to appropriate the results
of that labor and skill to the exclusive
use of the wife as her separate property,
as it would be to them to appropriate his
money. It is a man's first duty to provide a sufficient support for his wife and
family, and when that is accomplished he
has no legal or moral right to divert the
surplus earnings arising from his skill
and labor, to any other purpose than the
payment of his just debts, if he owes
any. * * * If there were no creditors
whose rights would be affected, of course,
he could work for whomsoever lie pleased,
and give any direction he chose, to the
results of that labor. * * * It is seldom,
however, that we find men working exclusively for and carrying on the business
of a general trade, in the name of the
wife, when there are no debts, the payment of which it is desirable to avoid.
The rule is that if the wife advance her
own separate money, and place the same
in the hands of her husband, for the purpose of carrying on any general trade,
and the husband by his labor and skill
in that undertaking, increase the fund,
the entire capital embarked in the enterprise, together with the increase, will not
constitute the separate estate of the wife,
but will be liable for the debts of the husband.
As between the husband and
wife, if the rights of no creditor inter-

vene, the rule might be different. * * *
If it be conceded that the money originally invested in the lumber business was
the separate estate of Mrs. Roe, it must
nevertheless,

* *

*

be regarded as

loaned to the husband."
See also,
Wortman v. Price,47 Ill. 22 ; Elyah v.
Taylor, 37 Id. 247 ; Coon v. .Rigden, 4
Col. 275.

A different rule may prevail under a
a statute passed in 1874: Langford v.
Greirson, 5 Ill. App. 362 ; Olsen v.
.Kern, 10 Id. 578.
3. A rule that seems to us more just
than either of the preceding, is announced
in Commonwealth' v. Fetcher, 6 Bush
171 : "But if the husband's labor and
attention to the wife's bu.iiness exceeded
in value the cost of supporting himself
and family, he and his creditors would
be entitled to the ascertained excess ;
but his obligation to support his family
was paramount to that of paying his
debts, and until he made provision for
the discharge of that obligation, the products of her farm would not be liable to
his debts, and not then unless it was
shown that the portion not needed therefor was the result of his labor and skill."1
See also Penn v. Whiteheads, 12 Grat.
(Va.) 74; M1artinez v. Ward, 19 'la.
175; Keller v. layer, 55 Ga. 406;
Quidorts' Adm'r. v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J.
Eq. 472 ; Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 2 0 Id.
13; Glidden v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509
Feller v. Alden, 23 Wis. 301.
It has been said that this right can be
enforced only in equity : Glidden v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509 ; Feller v. Allen, 23
Wis. 301.
There are express statutes in some
states forbidding the wife doing business
as a sole trader from employing the hns
band to superintend and carry on the
bnsiness. In these states the business,
when carried on by the husband, will be
regarded as his : Youngworth v. Jewell,
15 Nev. 45 ; Porter v. Gamba, 43 Cal.
105.

Where the wife has no statutory power
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to act as a sole trader, a business con- erally a question of fact for the jury or
ducted by the htniband in her name will other tribunal for the finding of facts :
Ladd v. Newell, 34 Minn. 107; Hossbe regarded generally as his: Buckley v.
Wells, 33 N. Y. 518; Gage v. Dauchy, feldt v. Dill, 28 Id. 469; Abbey v. De~o,
34 Id. 293! Freeman v. Orser, 5 Duer 44 N. Y. 343; Knapp v. Smith, 27 ld476 ; Wortman v. Price, 47 Ill. 22 ; 277 ; Gage v. Dauchy, 34 Id. 293.
Alt v. Laforette, 6 Mo. App. 91 ; PawGenerally the burden of proof is on
leg v. Vogd, 42 Mo. 291 ; Lyman v. the wife to show bona fides: Keeney v.
Race, 26 N. J. Eq. 30; Niat. Bank v.
Good, 21 Penn. St. 349; Langford v.
Sprague, 20 Id. 13; Bucher v. Ream, Greirson, 5 ll. App. 362; Erdman v.
68 Penn. St. 421.
Rosenthal, 60 Md. 312.
Even when she has such statutory
An understanding between husband
power and may employ him, such trans- and wife that he is to share in the profits
action should be regarded with suspicion : of the business carried on in her name
Ladd v. Newell, 84 Minn. 107; Brow- will make it liable for his debts: Hurlnell v. Dixon, 37 Ill. 197; Carn v. burt v. Jones, 25 Cal. 225.
As between husband and wife, where
Roger, 55 Ia. 650.
Courts will sometimes construe the the rights of creditors do not intervene,
wife's separate property in business there is no presumption in favor of a
in her name managed by the husband husband's interest in any business conas loaned to him: Keller v. $Mayer,55 ducted in her name: Broadwater v. J'aGa. 406 ; Wilson v. Loomis, 55 Ill. 352; coby, 19 Neb. 77; Wilson v. Loomis, 55
Glidden v. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509.
Ill. 352; Quidorts' Adm'r. v. Pergeaux,
18 N. J. Eq. 472 ; contra, Patten v.
And sometimes as a gift to him:
Brownel v. Dixon, 37 I1. 197 ; Dent v. Patten, 75 Ill. 446.
Slough, 40 Ala. 518 ; Freeman v. Orser,
CHAS. A. ROBBINS.
5 Duer 476.
Lincoln, Neb.
Good faith in such transactions is gen-
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A person obtaining property by fraud acquires no title to it, but it is held by him
and all persons claiming under him with notice, in trust for the original owner.
Equity will follow money or other property through any number of transmutations
and preserve it for the owner. So long as it can be traced and identified in either
its original or substituted form, it belongs to the original owner if he elects to
claim it.
Although the relation between a bank and its depositor is that merely of debtor
and creditor, yet the fund does not change its character from the fact that the money
has been deposited in bank to the credit of the depositor. If the money in his hands
was impressed with a trust in favor of another, the deposit will remain subject to
the same trust.

from Washington County District Court.
The substance of the complaint is stated in the opinion of the
APPEAL
court.
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C. B. &"A. G. Otis, for respondent.
Searles, Ewing & Gale, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MITCHELL, J.-Appeal from an order overruling a demurrer
to the complaint. The question raised by the appeal is whether,
upon facts alleged in the complaint, the respondent is entitled to
have a trust in its favor impressed upon a certain sum of money in
the hands of appellant. These facts, so far as they bear upon the
question, are, we think, fairly stated in the brief of respondent.
They may be perhaps even more briefly stated, according to their
legal import, as follows
R. W. Kerr by fraud and deceit obtained from respondent a loan
of $3500, the amount being placed to his credit and subject to
his draft or check, in respondent's bank. Kerr afterwards drew out
the money, and placed it in the possession and control of E. W.
Kerr as his agent, by causing it to be deposited in a bank in Stillwater to the credit and subject to the check of said F. W. Kerr.
Subsequently, the appellant, by fraud and false pretences, induced
E. W. Kerr, as agent of ER. W. Kerr, to pay over the money to it,
the appellant, which he did by check upon the Stillwater bank.
Subsequently R. W. Kerr died insolvent. To impress this money,
in the hands of appellant, with a trust in favor of respondent, and
to recover the same, this action is brought.
It is elementary that a person obtaining property by fraud acquires
no title to it, but it is held by him, and by all persons claiming
under him with notice, in trust for the original owner. So long as
the property can be identified in its original, or in a substituted form,
it belongs to the original owner, if he elects to claim it ; and if it
passes into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the title
of the defrauded owner, at his option, at once attaches to the avails,
so long as their identity is preserved, no matter how many transmutations of form the property has passed through. So long as the
trust property can be traced and followed into other property into
which it has been converted, that remains subject to the trust. The
product or substitute has the nature of the original imparted to it.
The depositing of trust money in a bank although it creates the
relation of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositor,
does not change its character or relieve the deposit from the trust.
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It is not the identity of the form, but the substantial identity of
the fund itself, i hich is the important thing.
In support of these propositions, and as illustrating the extent
to which courts of equity have carried this principle, see Taylor v.
Plumer, 3 Maule & S. 562; Pennell v. -eDell, 4 De Gex, M. & G.
372; Frith v. Cartland, 2 Hemming & Miller 417; Knatchbull v. Eallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696; Overseers of Poor v. Bank,
2 Grat. 544; Van Allen v. Amer. Nat. Bank, 52 N. Y. 1;
People. v. City Bank, 96 Id. 32; Craigie v. Hadley, 99 Id.
131; Whitley v. Toy, 6 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 34; Farmers' Bank v.
King, 57 Penn. St. 202; Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156; National
Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U. S. 54; M~cLeod v. .Evans, 28 N. W.
Rep. 173.
Some cases go so far as to hold that the trust character still
adheres to money, even though it cannot be traced into any specific
property. In the case at bar, it is not necessary to go to any such
length, in order to charge this money in the hands of appellant with
a trust in favor of respondent. Notwithstanding the various changes
and transmutations through which it has passed, the money that has
gone into the hands of appellant is readily traced up and identified
as the same money which R. W. Kerr obtained from respondent by
fraud and deceit, and is separable and distinguishable from any other
property or assets of Kerr. It is unimportant that when appellant
fraudulently obtained the money from Kerr, it did not know that
he had obtained it by fraud from respondent. Kerr certainly could
have claimed the money from appellant, and upon the principles of
the cases cited, respondent is at least subrogated to all the rights
Kerr had.
This disposes of the main question in the case. The appellant
however, further contends that the complaint is insufficient because
it does not allege that at the time of demand, or at the time of
bringing suit, it still had the money it had thus fraudulently obtained.
It is sufficient answer to this to say that, having traced the money
into appellant's possession, it is presumed to be there still. If the
money was returned to Kerr before the demand, that would be a
matter of defence.
Some point is made as to the form of the action. If a complaint
states a cause of action, it is no ground of demurrer that it prays
for the wrong relief. But with reference to future proceedings, we
may add that this action was properly brought as an equitable one,
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to enforce a constructive trust, in which all parties interested in the
disposition of the fund sought to be reached are proper parties.
Order affirmed.
1. The principle is of early application in the English jurisprudence, that a
separate or distinct fund, such as a debt
or a chose in action, may be seized upon
as the product of a trust fund, and reclaimed by the original owner, when lie
is able to trace such trust fund into it.
Burdett v. Willett, 2 Vernon 638, decided in 1708, was a case wiere a factor
had sold his principal's goods to a third
party, and had died insolvent, leaving
the goods unpaid for. The debt of the
purchaser for those goods was treated in
equity as trust-property, subject to the
claim of the principal, upon the theory
that it was the product of the goods, and
that the owner could thus identity it as
the proceeds of his trust-property, and
have the same trust impressed upon it.
The case thus allows the debt, as a separate chose in action, to be distinguished
from the factor's other property. Three
years later, in Whltecombe v. Jacob, 1
Salk. 160, a factor, who had sold his
principal's goods, had invested the proceeds in other goods, which were on
hand when he died insolvent. It was
held that these goods were in equity the
property of the principal, they being the
fruit or product of his property. In
Scott v. Snmaan, Willes 400 (1742),
the proceeds of the principal's goods, in
the shape of notes which had been taken
for the goods, were found in the hands of
the assignees in bankruptcy of the insolvent factor; and relief was given to the
principal in an action at law.
These cases were summarized by BunNET, J., in Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 172
(1749), in these words: " Suppose goods
are consigned to a factor, who sells them
and breaks ; the merchant for the money
must come in under the commission ; but
if the money is laid out in other goods,
these goods will not be subject to the

bankruptcy (citing Whitecombe v. Jacob)
Suppose, instead of selling the goods for
ready money, he sells for money payable at a future day, and breaks before
the day; if the assignees receive the
money, it will be for the use of the merchant. Or, suppose that the factor had
taken notes for the goods ; if his assignecs receive the tmoney upon these notes,
it will be to tle merchant's use. This
was determined in the court of common
pleas" (citing Scott v. Sumiaun).
In

Taylor v. .Pluner, 3 M. & Sew.

562 (1815), cited in the opinion in the
principal case, which has justly become
a leading case on the subject, the trust
fund was traced through similar transmutations. In the form of bank bills, it
had been intrusted by the owner to his
agent, who had invested it in stocks,
securities and bullion, and had then absconded. The principal having recovered
the last-named property from his agent,
after the latter had committed an act of
bankruptcy, was sued in trover by the
assignees in bankruptcy. Lord ELLENnoRouGH held that the property in its
new tbrm still belonged to the principal,
notwithstanding its changes, and that he
had rightfully recovered his own. Ris
language has trnished the text for many
later opinions on the subject: "The
product of or substitute for the original
thing still follows the nature of the thing
itself; so long as it can be ascertained to
be such, and the right only ceases when
the means of ascertainment fails."
In the recent English case of Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879),
a fund which was originally a trust fund
was followed into certain bonds in which
it had been invested by the trustee ; and
the proceeds of certain other securities
which the same wrongdoer had held as
an agent or bailee were followed into his
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'bank account; and both funds were recovered by their' beneficial owners.
In America, cases calling for the application of this doctrine have been even
more frequent than in England. In
Overseers of thePoor v. Bank of Virginia;
2 Grat. 544, an attorney had deposited
in a bank, mixed with his own moneys,
certain money collected for plaintiffs as
their attorney. The plaintiffs filed a bill
and recovered it, tracing it as a gross
sum simply. The court asserted the
right of a principal to follow his property wherever he could trace it, "whether it be in the hands of the agent, or
of his representatives or assignees, unless it has been transferred bonafide to a
purchaser of it, or to an assignee for
value without notice." In like manner,
a trust fund was traced into and recovered from a deposit made by an agent
in a bank, in Whitley v. Foy, 6 Jones
Eq. 34. This deposit had been made by
the agent in his own name, but with the
statement that it was the money of his
principal, which was taken as furnishing
a sufficient identification of the fund.
In Thompson v. Perkins, 3 Mason
232, factors who had sold goods and
had taken notes therefor in their own
names, made an assignment prior to the
maturity of the notes, and at maturity
the notes were collected by the assignees.
The owner of the goods was allowed to
trace their proceeds, by means of the
notes, into the debt collected by the assignees, and thus to recover from them
the amount thereof. STORY, J., said:
"Nothing is better settled at the present
day thai the doctrine that the principal
is entitled to recover whenever he can
trace his own property and distinguish it
from the mass of the property of his
factor."
In Kip v. Bank of New York, 10
Johns. 63, the same principle was applied in an action on the case. There,
the beneficiaries under a trust assignment, holders of certain notes, sued to
recover a fund, the proceeds of the asVOL. XXXV.-33

signment, which fund the trustee had deposited in tile bank in his own name,
and which was then in the hands of defendants, the assignees in insolvency of
tile said trustee, and to have such fund
applied to the payment of their notes.
KENT, C. J., held in their favor, and
said that the necessary requirement of
following and distinguishing the trust
fund was met by showing that it went
into the bank deposit, and thence into
the hands of defendants.
In National Bank v. King, 57 Penn.
St. 202, a real estate broker, who had
deposited the money of his clients in a
bank in his own name, absconded ; and
in a contest between the bank, an attaching creditor of the broker, and the
broker's clients, the latter were allowed
to recover from the bank so much of the
deposit as would cover the amount of
their funds deposited, although the bank
had, after notice from the broker's clients that they claimed the deposits, paid
out a part thereof on checks previously
drawn by the broker.
In Voight v. Lewis, 9 Chic. Leg. News
65, the plaintiff recovered the amount of
proceeds of the sale of his bonds by Jay
Cook & Co., as brokers, from their
The
trustee, after their bankruptcy.
money had been deposited by the brokers
in bank, in their own name, and it appeared simply that such deposits exceeded
in amount the sum claimed and recovered
by Voight.
In Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, the
assignees of a bankrupt banker sued to
recover property which, within four
months prior to the bankruptcy, the
banker had restored, as the proceeds of
trust property, to the person from whom
he had received the latter. It was held,
as it had been in Taylor v. Plumer, supra, that the true owner had only recovered his own.
In Van Alen v. Amer. Nat. Bank, 52
N. Y. 1, the agents of plaintiff sold his
bonds, and deposited the money for him,
but in their names, in defendant bank,
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and gave plaintiff a check therefor, on
which check plaintiff brought the suit.
It was held that while as payee simply
of the check, plaintiff would have had
no right of action, yet inasmuch as the
deposit was in fact a trust deposit, ie had
as cestui que trust the right to follow and
demand his property.
In. Schuler v. Laclede Bank, 27 Fed.
Rep. 424; a broker holding ibr collection
a note belonging to plaintiff, received as
a payment thereon, a check on a bank,
which le deposited, and then had the
fund transferred to a third bank, where
it was found on deposit, and was there
impressed with a trust in favor of plaintiff.
In National Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U.
S. 54, an agent of the insurance com-

pany kept an account with the bank, in
his own name as agent. There being a
large sum to the credit of this account,
the bank charged up against it an individual debt of the agent. The insurance company sued the bank, to recover
the entire deposit, and proved that the
deposit was all originally made up of its
own property; and this was held a sufficient identification of the entire deposit,
as a trust fund.
In Craigie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131,
the plaintifs had deposited with a bank,
on the eve of its failure, a quantity of
drafts, which were credited to them in
account, in the usual mode of crediting
deposits. The bank closed its doors next
day, and the plaintifls elected to rescind
the deposit, on the ground of the fraud
of the bank, in receiving the deposit
when its officers knew it to be insolvent.
The proceeds of the drafts in question,
hasing been found by plaintiffs in the
hands of third parties, to whom they had
been sent for collection, plaintiffs sued
these third parties, and were allowed to
recover the proceeds of the drafts, as a
trust fund.
2. In the foregoing cases, the identification of the trust fund was comparatively a simple matter. The right of

recovery of such a fund does not cease,
until ' the means of ascertainmeut fail."
How far the circumstances of particular
cases may afford " means of ascertainment," will often be found a question of
difficulty.
Lord ELLENBnOOUGH and
his predecessors thought the "means of
ascertainment" would fail, " when the
subject is turned into money, and mixed
and confounded in a general mass of the
same description," for the reason that, as
money, it would lose its ear-mark.
This difficulty of fet presented itself
to the Lords Justices, in the case of Pennell v. _)eff§ell, 4 DeG., Al. & G. 372.
It was a contest in equity, between the
successors in trust of a deceased assignee
in bankruptcy, and his executors, over
funds deposited in bank by the deceased
in his individual name, but said to have
belonged to several bankrupt estates.
They were, in part, identified as having
arisen from these estates ; but the agent
had mixed these funds with his own, and
the mingling of trust and private moneys
in a mass, in the coffers of a bank, was
evident. The court ingeniously settled
the difficulty, by treating the bank account itself as a se.parate thing, a chose
in action, which being partly the product
of trust funds, might be subjected as trust.
property, pro tanto. In this respect it
was compared to a box or chest into
which trust and other moneys might be
undistingui~hably placed, and from which
sums miglit, at intervals, be drawn. So
long as any moneys are found in the receptacle, not in excess of the trust funds,
equity will impress on them the trust
character ; and this, notwithstanding the
funds, while in this receptacle, may have
been subjected to so many transmutations,
that no particular portion remaining, can
be identified as a specific part or product
of the trust fund, specifically. The court
finds a ready illustration in the way in
which equity traces the capital of a deceased partner through the permutations
of a trade or business carried on by surviving partners, who have improperly
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retained that capital, and thus have made
themselves trustdes. "The-very capital
itself may consist only of the balance,
which at the death of tile
partner, was
due to him as the result of the partnership account. That capital may haveno
existence, but in the stock in trade, and
the debts due the partnership. The stock
in trade and debts may undergo a continual course of change and fluctuation ;
and yet this court follows the trust capital through all its ramifications, and
gives to the beneficiaries of the deceased
partner's estates the fruits derived from
that capital, so continuously altered and
changed.
A case in which a court of equity so
followirg a trust fund through the permutations and ramifications of a stock in
trade, and the business carried on therewith, and preserved it for the rightful
owner, is found in Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Mylne & C. 41. So, upon
similar principles, Chancellor KENT, in
Long v. 11fajestre, 1 Johns. Ch. 305, followed the funds of A. through the hands
of B. into the mercantile business and
stock in trade of C., and compelled him
to account.
Another extreme instance in America
is found in the case of Leland v. Collrer,
34 Mich. 418. Chattel mortgages upon
storks of goods in trade are held in
Michigan to be valid and not fraudulent.
A mortgaged stock of goods had, subsequent to the mortgage, passed successively into the hands of several vendees.
Each of these vendees, having had notice
of the trust, was held to be in his turn a
trustee of the mortgaged property, so the
stock in trade remaining in the hands of
the last vendee was impressed with a
trust in behalf of the mortgagee.
In United States v. Waterborough,
Davies 154, a pension had been procured
by fraud from the plaintiff, and a large
portion of it had been unlawfully retained by the pensioner's attorney as his
fee. The town of Waterborough sued
the pensioner for money paid forhis sup-

port as a pauper, and garnished the attorney, who paid a part of the fee to thu
town by way of compromise. The United
States then sued for, and recovered from
the town, the latter sum, tracing it as a
trust-fund simply by the fact that the attorney had no other fund of the pauper
in his hands except the pension money.
Through a similar circuity of investments, a trust-fund was traced in the
English ease of -rith v. Cartland, 2 Hem.
& Miller 417. It was a fund arising
from acceptances given fora special purpose. It was diverted to other purposes
and converted, first into a check, then
into cash, and then into foreign securities, which were impressed with the trust.
In People v. Cityr Bank, 96 N. Y. 32,
the bank received from a depositor
checks for the payment of two notes formerly discounted by them, and then
charged said checks to his general account, and soon thereafter failed. The
bank in fact did not have the notes, but
had sold them to a third party andreceived the proceeds before the checks
above named were drawn ; and of these
facts the depositor was ignorant. The
receiver of the hank was ordered, on the
application of the depositor, to pay him
the full amount of the notes out of the
general assets of the bank in his hands,
on the ground that the bank was a trustee in the matter of the checks, and the
proceeds of the notes belonged in equity
to the depositor ; and though specific
identification was impossible, the general assets in the hands of the receiver
were pro tanto impressed with a trust in
So, also, in
favor of the depositor.
Peak v. Ellicott, 30 Kan. 156, where
money had been paid to a bank for the
particular purpose of paying a note, supposed to have been held by it, but which
was in fact held by another bank, the
bank -which had received the money
failed to pay the note and then became
insolvent ; and the general fund in the
hands of the assignee of the bank was impressed with a trust pro tanto.
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Somewhat similar was the Wisconsin
case of JLkLeod v. Evans, 28 N. W.
Rep. 173, where the plaintiff deposited
with H., a banker, for collection, a draft
on New York, which H. was to send
there for collection. He, in fact, sent it
to a Chicago bank, which gave him credit
therefor, and H. drew against it until it
was exhausted, and afterwards suspended
business. His assignee received only a
small amount of money, but collected
other assets and converted them into
money, and McLeod sued him for the
full amount of the draft. It was held
that H., having used the proceeds of the
draft, either to pay off his debts or to increase his assets, they were somewhere
in the assets conveyed to the assignee, so
that they were traced into the estate in
his hands, which were, pro tanto, impressed with a trust.
3. In the recent case of Fletcher v.
Sharpe, 26 Am. L. Reg. 71, the Supreme

Court of Indiana took the distinction
that a trust fund, the trustee of which
had deposited it in a bank, in his name,
as such trustee, could not be followed into
the assets of the bank, in the hands of a
receiver after its failure, and recovered
therefrom, as a trust fund, for the reason
that by such deposit, the trustee had
made himself simply a general creditor
of the bank, as to that fund, and the
further reason that, as was there argued,
equity follows and preserves a trust fund
under this principle, only as against an
attempted misappropriation of it by the
trustee. From the cases above cited, it
will be seen that the Indiana doctrine is
exceptional, and that the doctrine of a
great number of the authorities is that a
trust fund, no matter how it becomes such,
may always be followed and recovered
if it be possible to trace it clearly.
JAMES 0.

PIERo.

Minneapolis.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
JACOB GRISSELL v. HOUSATONIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
A statute which provides that where an injury is done to a building or other property by fire communicated by a locomotive of a railroad, without contributory negligence on the part of the occupier of the property, the railroad company shall be
liable in damages, is not unconstitutional.
Ziegler v. South Alabama Rd., 58 Ala. 394, distinguished.
Per Loomis, J.-It is a mistake to suppose that it necessarily transcends the limits
of valid legislation, of the one using extra hazardous instrumentalities, which put in
jeopardy a neighbor's property, is made to bear the risk thereby occasioned, even
though negligence cannot be proved.
Such a statute is applicable to an action against a railroad company chartered
before its passage but whose charter contains a reservation of the right to amend and
is made subject to all subsequent general laws, aud it is also applicable, notwithstanding that under the laws of the state the risk from fire may have been taken into
consideration in appraising the damages for the land taken.
'
The words "other property," in such statute, although used in connection with
"buildings," embraces fences, growing trees and herbage.

J. S. TurrilU, for the plaintiff.
M. W. Seyman and H. H. Knapp, far the defendants.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
Loomis, J.-This action is founded on the statute of 1881 (Session Laws of that year, ch. 92), the first section of which is as
follows : "Where an injury is done to a building or other property
of any person or corporation by a fire communicated by a locomotive engine of any railroad corporation, without contributory negligence on the part of the person or corporation entitled to the care
and possession of the property injured, the said railroad corporation
shall be held responsible in damages to the extent of such injury to
the person or corporation so injured; and any railroad corporation
shall have an insurable interest in the property for which it may be
so held responsible in damages along its route, and may procure
insurance thereon in its own behalf."
The plaintiff was the owner and possessor of land adjoining the
defendant's railroad track in the town of New Milford, and certain
of his fences, growing trees and herbage thereon, were destroyed by
fire communicated by the defendant's locomotive engine. There
was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and he
brought this suit to recover damages for the injury received, and
obtained a verdict in his favor in the court below.
The defendant gives six distinct reasons for his appeal to this
court, but none of them can avail to set aside the plaintiff's verdict,
if the statute is valid, and can be construed to cover the property
injured. Our discussion, therefore, will be confined essentially to
these two points :
Is the statute a valid one ?
The defendant's counsel, in his argument, presented a powerful
arraignment of the statute as denying to railroad corporations the
equal protection of the laws, in that it makes them liable for the
consequences of a lawful act without any fault or negligence ; and
as taking away their property without due process of law, in that
it deprives them of a legal defence; and as impairing the rights
given them by their charters, which authorize the use of fire, steam
and locomotive engines, while requiring trains to be run for the
benefit of the public, for the unavoidable consequences of which
acts the statute makes them liable.
The several counts in this indictment seem to be based principally upon this one principle of the common law, that for a lawful,
reasonable and careful use of property, the owner cannot be made
liable.
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But this principle is not so wrought into the constitution, or into
the very idea of property, that it cannot be departed from by the
legislature, where protection to persons or property may require it.
But the defendant also invokes another principle, which it is
claimed the statute violates, namely, the equal protection of the
law. But, to give force to this objection, it should appear that a
burden is cast on railroad corporations, from which all others are
exempt under similar circumstances, There can, of course, be no
such inequality if the circumstances are radically different. This
consideration seems to have been ignored in the argument for the
defendant, or else it was erroneously assumed that the circumstances
were similar. Some of the cases cited in behalf of the defendant
will illustrate the distinction to which we refer.
In Durkee v. City of Janesvilte, 28 Wis. 464, an act had been
passed, providing that the city of Janesville should be holden to
pay no costs in any action brought against it to set aside any tax
assessment or tax deed, or to prevent the collection of any tax.
The act was held void, because it exempted one corporation by
name from a burden from which no other was exempt under like
circumstances, and it enabled the city to recover its own costs, if it
recovered judgment, but denied it to the other party to the same
litigation, in case judgment was recovered against the city. So in
Ohio Miss. Rd. v. Lackey, 78 Ill. 55, an Illinois statute was held
unconstitutional and void which made the railroad company liable
for all the burial expenses and coroners' fees incurred, where anyone happened to die or be killed in any way in the cars of such
railroad. This act attempted to make the company liable, though
a person might die from a mortal sickness which was upon him
when he entered the car, or by his own hand, or in other ways, in
regard to which the company would have no agency whatever. The
distinction between such a case and the one at bar is too manifest
to require further comment.
The only case cited which supports the defendant's position in
the least, is the case of Zeigler v. South Alabama Bd., 58 Ala.
594, where a statute of that state was held unconstitutional, which
declared that railroad corporations should be liable and make compensation to the owner for all damages to live stock caused by their
locomotives or trains, without any reference to the skill or diligence
with which the train was operated, unless there was some contributory negligence on the part of the owner other than permitting the
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stock to run at large. There might be a difference of opinion, in
different jurisdictions, as to the validity of such legislation. But,
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the decision was right, there
is an important distinction between the two cases. There the animals injured were where they ought not to have been,-trespassers
obstructing the defendant's railroad track, directly exposing the
defendant's property to hazard and loss; here, the property injured
was where it ought to have been, on the plaintiff's own premises,
occasioning no hazard to the railroad company. There, too, it was
possible for the owner to have kept his stock on his own premises,
where they would have been safe ; but here it was not possible for
the plaintiff to avoid the loss that he suffered byany act of his own.
It is a mistake to suppose that it necessarily transcends the limits
of valid legislation, or violates the principle of a just equality before the law, if the one using extra hazardous materials or instrumentalities, which put in jeopardy a neighbor's property, is made
to bear the risk and pay the loss thereby occasioned, if there is no
fault on the part of the owner of the property, even though negligence in the other party cannot be proved. If at statute should
make the owner of a vicious domestic animal liable for the damage
it might occasion, without proof of scienter, or knowledge of its
vicious propensity, as required by the common law, we do not think
the act would be void. Such a statute would only be a new application of an ancient common-law principle, that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer loss from an act done, it is just that it
should fall on the one who caused the loss, rather than upon the
other, who had no agency in producing it, and could not by any
means have avoided it.
An ancient statute of this state, which has been very often
enforced, makes the owner of dogs, or if the owner is a minor or
apprentice, the parent, guardian or master, liable for all the damage
done by them, irrespective of any fault or negligence on the part
of the owner : Gen. Stats. p. 267, sect. 5. Another statute (Gen.
Stats. p. 489, sect. 6), makes one who kindles a fire on his own or
any land, liable for all damage it may do if it runs on to the land
of another, and proof of negligence is not required. We are not
aware that the validity of any of these statutes has been called in
question. The dangerous character of the thing used is always to
be considered in determining the validity of statutory regulations
fixing the liability of parties so using it. Fire has always been
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subject to arbitrary regulations, and the common law of England
was more severe and arbitrary on the subject than any statute. In
Rolle's Abridgment (Action on the Case, B., title Fire), it is said :
"If any fire by misfortune burns the goods of another man, he shall
have his action on the case against me. If a fire breaks out suddenly in my house, I not knowing it, and it burns my goods and
also my neighbor's house, he shall have his action on the case against
me. So if the fire is caused by a servant, or a guest, or any person
who entered the house with my consent. But otherwise, if it is
caused by a stranger who enters the house against my will."
It ought perhaps to be stated that this has not been adopted as
the common-law rule in the United States.
In most states, we presume, there are arbitrary police regulations
concerning the transportation or deposit of gunpowder. Would
the constitutionality of a statute be questioned that should make
one who deposi.ts large quantities of gunpowder or dynamite on his
own premises, in dangerous proximity to the property of another,
liable for any loss thereby occasioned to the latter, without proof
of negligence ?
There is no force in the objection that the statute under consideration unjustly selects only railroad corporations to bear the burden
of an extraordinarv risk. It is confined to them because they alone
have the privilege of taking a narrow strip of land from each owner,
without his consent, along the route selected for the track, and of
traversing the same at all hours of the day and night, and at all
seasons, whether dry or wet, with locomotive engines that scatter
fire along the margin of the land not taken, thereby subjecting all
combustible property to extraordinary hazard of loss, and that too
for the sole profit of the corporation. The argument for the defendant is fallacious in erroneously assuming that the statute denies to
the defendant a good defence which at common law all others would
have under similar circumstances.
In Jones v. Pestiniog By., Law Rep., 3 Q. B. Div. 733, in a
suit against an unchartered railway company, it was proved by the
defendants that all reasonable precautions had been taken to prevent
the emission of sparks from a locomotive engine used by them. But
it was held, nevertheless, that they were liable on the ground that
the locomotive was a dangerous engine to be brought and used by
the defendants even upon their own premises, and that they must
bear the consequences in case of damage to others. Wharton, in
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his treatise on Negligence, § 868, lays down the same doctrine as to
the liability of unchartered companies at common law.
How then can it transcend the limits of just and valid legislation to attach to chartered railroad companies for doing the same
act, under the same circumstances, the same liability, where the
charter, as in this case, is an open. one, expressly made subject to
all general laws ?
In Hooksett v. Rd., 88 N. H. 242, where the construction of a
similar statute was under consideration, EASTMAN, J., in giving the
opinion of the court, used this suggestive language: "The extraordinary use of the element of fire by which the property of individuals situated along the lines of railroads becomes endangered
beyond the usual and ordinary hazard to which it is exposed, no
doubt caused the legislature to interfere. * * * By this exposure
an increased risk of loss of property is caused. The risk must be
borne by some one; and if the property is insured, a larger premium must be paid. Upon whom shall this risk fall and this burden
rest ? Upon the owner of the property, or upon the corporations
who make this extraordinary use of the fire ?"
The only answer, it seems to us, which a due sense of justice can
dictate, is the one given in that case- that the responsibility and
burden should rest on the corporations. No other mode of adjusting
this risk can be suggested so just toward all parties as this. Before
the statute, upon taking land for railroad purposes, it was possible
upon the appraisal to include something for the increased risk to
buildings on the land not taken, confining it, however, to the diminished value of the remaining property caused by the risk: Pierce
on Railroads 215: In re Utica, &c., Bd., 56 Barb. 456; Wil. &
Bead. Rd. v. Stauffer, 60 Penn. St. 847. But it would seem
extremely difficult to make any just appraisal, even on this .limited
basis, and it could have no application to buildings afterwards placed
on the land, nor to buildings which might be destroyed by fire from
this source on land more remote from the railroad, no part of which
was taken or appraised, nor to any personal property whatever.
And it would of course be utterly impracticable to assess beforehand damages for property that might be destroyed in the future.
And here we may suggest that the statute under consideration,
though often characterized as arbitrary, is really based on a principle quite similar to that which allows an assessment in favor of
the landowner founded on the risk of fire from the same source. In
VOL. XXXV.-34
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both cases it is assumed that there is a risk and that it is justly
placed on the corporation. The statute carefully guards the interests
of the corporations by giving them an insurable interest in all the
property for which they may be made liable, and sect. fourth provides that no appraisal of damages for land taken or injured by the
location or construction of a railroad shall hereafter include any
compensation for the increased risk to anybuilding outside of such
location, on account of sparks from the locomotive engines on such
railroad.
This last provision suggests that the statute is not quite so equitable in its application to the defendant company, which established
its railroad before the statute was enacted, as to corporations afterwards formed. It can of course derive no benefit from this provision except as to land it may have taken since the enactment of
the statute., The record is silent as to when the land in question
was taken, or whether or not anything was at the time included or
claimed as damages on account of the risk from fire to the property
now owned by the plaintiff.
No question founded on these facts was made in the court below,
and of course is not to be entertained in this court for the purposes
of decision. We may however remark as to the general provisions
of the statute, that if they are valid as to railroads to be established,
they may be equally so as to railroads already in existence. The
defendant's charter not only contains an explicit reservation for the
legislature to alter, amend or repeal it, but makes it also in terms
subject to all general laws the legislature may thereafter pass.
And as to any defence suggested by the assumption that an appraisal of the general risk from fire may have been made to the
plaintiff originally or his grantor, while we reserve a final decision
of the question for the case in which it properly arises, we may here
suggest that where the original appraisal only gave damages to the
extent that the property was diminished in value in consequence of
the risk, and the same property is afterwards destroyed, the damages to be recovered under the statute would of course only represent the remaining, or diminished value, so that the statute cannot
properly be charged with allowing double damages for the same
thing.
In other jurisdictions the original appraisal and the indemnity
provided by the statute have not been considered so inconsistent as
that both might not exist together: Pierce v. Worcester & Nashua
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Rd., 105 Mass. 199; Bangor, ftc..Rd., v. Mc Comb, 60 Me. 290;
Adden v. White Mt. Rd., 55 N. H. 413; -Lyman v. Boston J-Wor.
Rd., 4 Cush. 288.
In further confirmation of our reasoning as to the validity of the
statute we make the following citations: Redfield, in his Treatise
on the Law of Railways, p. 560, published in 1857, alluding to
the statutes similar to the one under consideration, said: "We
cannot forbear to add that the interference of the legislatures upon
this subject in many of the American states, seems to us an indication of the public sense in favor of placing the risk, in such cases,
upon the party in whose power it lies most to prevent such injuries
occurring."
In Pierce on Railroads, p. 444, it is said: "Statutes have been
enacted making the company liable even in the absence of negligence, for injuries to private property caused by fire communicated
by its engines, which in effect makes it an insurer in case of such
injury. These statutes are constitutional, even when applied to
pre-existing corporations."
In 2 Wood's Railway Law, sect. 331, it is said: "In some states
railway companies are made liable, irrespective of the question of
negligence, for fires set by their engines, and as a compensation for
this extraordinary liability are given an insurable interest in such
property; and these statutes have been held constitutional, even in
their application to corporations established before the statute was
passed, and although damages for the risk of fire were considered
-when the land was taken." In the well-considered case of Rodemacker v. Milwaukee & St. -PaulRd., 41 Iowa 297, the court discussed at length the constitutionality of a provision of the code of that
state, "that any corporation operating a railway shall be liable for
all damages by fire that is set out or caused-by the operating of any
such railway," and fully sustained the act, even as applicable to
pre-existing railways.
The counsel for the defendant in tle eOse at bar sought to impair
the force of the decision by reason of the fact that in Iowa the code
had entirely supplanted the common law. The distinction seems
to us not well taken. The legislature surely could acquire no additional power by exercising its sovereign will twice; first, in abolishing the common law, and theti in enacting the statute. And the
objection as to inequality before the law, so persistently urged against
our statute, applies with . eqlual force to the provision of the Iowa
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code, for that applies exclusively to railway corporations, the same
as our statute.
In Lyman v. Boston & Worcester Bd., 4 Cush. 290, it was held
that a similar statute in Massachusetts was applicable to railroads
established before as well as since its passage, and that it extended
as well to estates a part of which is conveyed by the owner as to
those of which a part is taken by authority of law. The constitutionality of the statute was not discussed, but the principles stated
as constituting its foundation directly apply. DEWEY, J., in delivering the opinion, on p. 291, said: "We consider this one of those
remedial acts passed for the more effectual protection of property
-against the hazards to which it has become subject by the introduction of the locomotive engine. The right to use the parcel of land
appropriated to a railroad does not deprive the legislature of the
power to enact such regulations, and impose such liabilities for
injuries suffered from the mode of using the road, as the occasion
and circumstances may reasonably justify." This reasoning clearly
makes the legislation in question a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state. See also the comments of SHAW, 0. J., in
delivering the opinion in Hart et al.v. Western Rd., 13 Met. 105,
and of BIGELoW, 0. J., in Ross v. Boston & Worcester Rd., 6
Allen 90.
The remaining question relates to the construction of the
statute. Do the words, "other property" embrace fences, growing
trees and herbage, the property injured in this case ?
The entire description in the statute is "building or other property," and the defendant invokes the benefit of the principle of
interpretation known as, "noseitur a soeiis," that is, that the particular word "building," being followed by the general words, "or
other property," the latter only includes subjects ' ejusdem gen-

eris. $
This rule has been often recognised and applied, but we think its
application to this case would work injustice and tend to defeat, in
part, the object of the statute.
The statute is clearly remedial, and ought to be construed liberally to effectuate the intention of the legislature, which was to give
the owners of property along the route of the railroad indemnity for
the loss of all property that might reasonably be said to be exposed
to danger from the source referred to. And besides, the above
maxim would be exceedingly difficult of application, unless the
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words "other property," should be entirely rejected. The hay,
grain, farming tools, and live stock in a barn, the goods in a store,
the personal property in a house or factory, would hardly be ejusdem generis with a "1building," and can it be possible that the legislature intended only a partial indemnity for the building alone,
overlooking the greater value of property within and without ?
Then, as to growing trees, the legislature would have in view the
fact that railroads traverse the forests as well as the open fields, and
that, by reason of the annual deposit of dry leaves, the former were
peculiarly exposed to danger from fire ; and again, we ask, can it
be supposed that, in framing a general act of indemnity, the owners
of this species of property were not to be included ?
There is some disagreement as to the construction of this language, as used in similar statutes in other jurisdictions, but in no
instance has such property as was injured in this case been excluded.
In the state of Maine, it is extended to all property having a
permanent location along the route, such as buildings and their contents, fences, trees and shrubbery; but it is held not to extend to a
pile of cedar posts temporarily deposited near the railroad : Chapman v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence Bd., 87 Maine 92 ; Prattv. Same,
42 Id. 579.
But it is said that a proper interpretation of the language we have
been considering, cannot be reached without first determining
whether the railroad company could have procured insurance on
the property injured. The argument in brief is, that as the statute
gives a railroad company an insurable interest in all the property
for which it may be made liable, it cannot be made liable where no
insurance could have been obtained. Hence, in this case, a witness
was offered to testify that he knew of no insurance company that
would insure fences, growing trees and herbage. This testimony
was rejected, and this is made a distinct ground of error ; but,- as
we stated at the outset, it depends upon the construction of the statute
and requires no separate consideration.
The statute would be extremely uncertain if its enforcement
depended on the ability of the railroad company to obtain insurance. The withdrawal of insurance companies from issuing policies
in a particular state, owing to unfriendly legislation or an alteration
of their charters, might, in effect, nullify the law as to railroads in
that state.
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Undoubtedly the statute confers an insurable interest, co-extensive with the property for which the railroad company may be responsible, and gives liberty to obtain such insurance in its own name,
with any other party who is able and willing to contract, relative to
the subject-matter. If there was an adherent impossibility of obtaining insurance upon any particular species of property, the argument would have more force, but there is no such impossibility. It
is a matter of common information that the scope and subject-matters of insurance are being extended constantly, in all directions,
so that now there are insurance companies that issue policies of
insurance against a great variety of hazards, both physical and
moral. The reason for conferring this insurable interest upon the
railroad companies, will further illustrate its meaning and effect.
Before the statute, the risk from fire was upon the owner of the
property, and he alone had an insurable interest, but as the statute
shifted the risk from the owner to the railroad company, it also, as
a matter of justice and equity, conferred upon the latter the insurable interest, with the right to obtain, in its own name, such insurance. The corporation now has the same capacity to contract for
insurance that the owner had before. All that is needed to make
a valid contract, is a corresponding capacity on the part of some
other corporation or individual. The statute, however, does not
concern itself with the last-named party.
In Massachusetts, a statute containing the same language as to
the description of the property and insurance, has been construed
to include all kinds of combustible property, real and personal, even
where the corporation had no knowledge or reasonable cause to
believe that there was property situated where it was exposed to
injury: Boss v. Boston Worcester Bd., 6 Allen 87.
In Trask v. Hartford New Haven Bd., 16 Gray 71, a part of
the property injured consisted of a fence, and HOAR, J., in delivering the opinion of the court said: "A fence is not so commonly
insured, probably because its value and risk do not make insurance
desirable; but it certainly can be insured. Whether a just construction of the statute of 1840 would require any limitation of the
extremely comprehensive language used to define the liability of
railroad corporations created by it, this case gives us no occasion to
consider. We certainly do not intend to intimate, by putting our
decision upon the ground above stated, that the property must be
insurable, in the ordinary or commercial sense of that word, to make

